The Lawyer as Professional: Examination, Licensing, and the Problem of Deceptive Packaging by Kennedy, Robert H.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 4 Article 2
Fall 1979
The Lawyer as Professional: Examination,
Licensing, and the Problem of Deceptive Packaging
Robert H. Kennedy
Florida State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Legal Profession Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert H. Kennedy, The Lawyer as Professional: Examination, Licensing, and the Problem of Deceptive Packaging, 7 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 601
(2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol7/iss4/2
THE LAWYER AS PROFESSIONAL: EXAMINATION,
LICENSING, AND THE PROBLEM OF DECEPTIVE
PACKAGING
ROBERT H. KENNEDY*
The intent of the tree expert law was primarily to protect the
public against tree quacks, shysters and inexperienced persons.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of law is a public occupation which is privately per-
formed. A great deal is written about lawyers, yet the public knows
very little about lawyering. What the public is told-that the mem-
bers of the profession do certain kinds of well identified things, plus
a lot of other things less generally associated with the profession,
and that all the things they do are important-is told by lawyers.
Who the lawyers are, what they alone may do, and how well they
are required to perform within their exclusive domain are matters
left for lawyers to determine. Theirs is quintessentially a self-
regulating and self-disciplining occupation; lawyers define their
own market, determine who shall be licensed to enter it, and decide
who is to be disciplined and removed. They determine the manner
in which the legal market is to be organized and how its activities
are to be performed. The exercise of this power is supported by law
and is asserted to take place solely in the public interest.
In fact, lawyers have little information about themselves. They
don't know much about who they are or what they corporately do;
they have no satisfactory concept of the public interest, nor any
common idea about how it ought to be served. In other words, law-
yers exercise significant governmental authority but without the
informing standards, criteria, or data necessary for the task. Conse-
quently, it is impossible to determine whether their authority is well
or poorly exercised.
It is the thesis of this article that it is not so important to lawyers
that they actually know these things; what is important to the pro-
fession is that the public believes that they do. It is this author's
purpose to consider the practice of the admission of lawyers to, and
* Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. B.A. 1956, Antioch College;
LL.B. 1959, Yale University.
1. Testimony of N. Johnson, chairman, Illinois State Tree Expert Examining Board,
before the Illinois State Legislature, quoted in Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. &
EcoN. 93, 93 n.1 (1961); cf. State v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 1962), vacated, 373 U.S.
379 (1963), rev'd for mootness, 159 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1964) ("It [lawyer licensing] is done to
protect the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by unqualified persons
.. .
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the preclusion of individuals from lawyering, and then to relate
those activities to a theory of professionalization that in turn may
be employed both to identify the public interest and incidentally to
judge lawyering.1
The asserted interest served by government supported licensure
and self-regulation is the protection of the community from incom-
petent legal services. This goal is addressed almost exclusively by
regulation of who may practice law.3 The control mechanism con-
sists of examination, character investigation, laws forbidding unau-
thorized practice, and the discipline of licensed practitioners.4 The
licensing process, however, has been shown consistently to ignore
and perhaps invade the public's interest in good lawyering. The
current system of market control is sustained through collaboration
between the members of the legal profession and the state judicial
and legislative departments;' it persists with neither information
2. This is a self-evident professional responsibility of lawyers. "Because we have been
entrusted with this solemn responsibility, our profession's right to self-governance is only as
good as its pledge to public service." Address of Chief Justice Arthur J. England of the Florida
Supreme Court, Convention of the Florida Bar (June 16, 1979). Florida Bar News, June 25,
1979, at 12, col. 1.
3. James Bradner, Assistant Director of the ABA's National Center for Professional Disci-
pline, reports that "[t]he critical issue regarding to [sic] the practice of law in the United
States, however, is the determination of who may practice law not how that practice is
constituted." Bradner, Responses Regarding the Practice of Law in the United States of
America to a Questionnaire on Government Regulation of the Practice of Law as it Affects
the Professional Conduct and Practice of Lawyers For Use by the International Bar Associa-
tion Sidney Conference, September 10-17, 1978, at 26 (March 10, 1978) (emphasis added).
Prescription of the manner in which lawyers may organize themselves to provide services and
rules governing how and where services may be delivered and how they may be paid for are
examples of other limitations that, together with the informational regulations, unify control.
4. Only some barriers and regulations are considered here to illustrate function (or its
absence) within those accepted theoretical bases used to justify the public cost of licensure.
We will look at those regulatory processes specifically said to offer public protection against
incompetent legal services. Other limitations, barriers and expressions of regulatory power
are treated as either supportive or substantially irrelevant (such as market division treaties
between lawyers and other occupational groups; see, e.g., Statements of Principles and Agree-
ments Between the American Bar Association and Various Other Groups-Statement of
Principles Relative to Realtors, 14 (no. 3) UNAUTH. PRAc. NEWS 17, app. 27-29 (1948)). Some
limitations, such as prohibitions on advertising, organizational limits, etc., will be considered
in a forthcoming article.
5. The present authority of the profession will not be permanently insulated against
outside intervention by reliance upon rhetoric or "state action" theories such as that in Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), and despite language such as that found in Leis v. Flynt, 99
S. Ct. 698 (1979). Any lawyer who believes that prior case law, or mere posturing in the public
interest, will withstand a tide of public opinion is a poor historian. Resistance will, however,
delay the process. The American Bar Association is reported to have pledged its support to
state bar associations in resisting the Federal Trade Commission's recent inquiries into state
restraints on lawyering. Picket, ABA Offers Bar Units Help with FTC Probe, NAT'L L.J., Feb.
26, 1979, at 3.
6. It is a circumstance of little more than history that the boundaries of the legal services
market are essentially geographic. Each state has, within its boundaries, almost total control
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nor language adequate to the task of identifying, much less fulfill-
ing, its function. That the process is dedicated to the public interest
is immaterial. An awareness of the true value of this process is
gradually developing: Licensing for the practice of law is a symbolic
act, a ceremonial process that impedes the profession in its efforts
to address its role, that permits the profession largely to ignore the
community interests involved in what it does, and that allows the
profession to avoid considering the substantial public costs resulting
from self-regulation.'
The legal profession has, in sum, failed to identify or to measure
the public costs and benefits associated with self-control of its mar-
kets.' Lawyers, supported by government, adhere to a self-
perpetuating system of market control. They defend a ceremonial
system using declaration as a proxy for information, and they de-
scribe what they are doing with language that is hazardously depen-
dent upon abstractions for which there are few if any corresponding
realities. What the actual merits or public usages of these market
of admissions, discipline, and regulation. See Leis v. Flynt, 99 S. Ct. 698, 700-01 (1979);
Appell v. Reiner, 204 A.2d 146, 148 (N.J. 1964). The boundaries are under increasing assault
by the needs of national commerce, the growth in importance of federal constitutional, statu-
tory and administrative law, and the multistate law practices which respond to these needs.
State courts and state bars-eyeing many factors, not the least of which is the protection of
local markets-are not quick to lower those barriers. In Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So. 2d 559
(Fla. 1978), the Florida Supreme Court detailed the terms of a permanent injunction issued
against a New York law firm's "unauthorized practice of law" in connection with the firm's
Miami office. The injunction includes a prohibition upon "engaging in such other professional
activities . . . as may be prohibited hereafter by reason of any court decision, or rule or
regulation . . . or custom or practice which may hereafter be promulgated or accepted by
this Court .... Id. at 560. One must step lightly indeed to avoid violating any "custom"
later "accepted" by a court.
7. "Licensure" here applies an exclusive right to engage in an activity which is enforced
through state action. Certification, registration, and other lesser forms of restriction or identi-
fication of practitioners and/or their degrees of competence generally confer no such right.
See generally M. FREIDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1962). It is not useful to certify
lawyers, because certification attests to compliance with a standard of competence; in the
law, competence has never been identified.
8. For a review of the literature reaching much the same conclusion, i.e., that any connec-
tion between professional licensing practices and protection of the public is not established
and probably is specious, see generally M. FREIDMAN, supra note 7; Gross, The Myth of
Professional Licensing, 1978 (no. 11) AMER. PSYCH. 1009. There appears to be no theoretical
or empirical study that supports the claim that licensing can be shown to be in the public
interest. But see S. CARROLL & R. GASTON, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: FINAL REPORT (1977)
[hereinafter cited as CARROLL STUDY]. This study suggests, in a preliminary analysis, that
in law (alone of the professions) there may be some statistically positive association between
restrictive licensing and the quality of service delivered. Id. at 29. However, the CARROLL
STUDY is acknowledged by its authors to be dependent on the assumption that "licensing
authorities truly use quality as a limiting device." Id. app. II, at 6. Of course, that is an
assumption that comes close to throwing the game. Furthermore, the validity of the lawyer
"rating" system which was employed by the study (the MARTINDALE-HUBEL LAw DIRECTORY)
is, as the authors acknowledge, subject to question.
1979]
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controls may be is left professionally unaddressed.
The public costs imposed by lawyer self-regulation are partly rec-
ognized, rarely acknowledged, and never measured. No compensat-
ing public benefits have yet been demonstrated. Government inter-
vention currently gives every appearance of being little more than
a form of social and economic protectionism which promotes income
redistribution to lawyers,' imposes a wealth dependent allocation of
public legal rights, and provides no identifiable encouragement to
the provision of adequate and competent services. The defensive
mentality increasingly exhibited by the organized bar is likely a
consequence of its continued attempt to defend this inherited, un-
studied, and, upon analysis, unwarranted monopoly of a broad and
varied range of essential public services. 0 The bar's longstanding
obligation, and its current need, is to justify its self-asserted and
self-defined monopoly by developing a means to define what it
does-and what it should be doing-to promote the quantity and
quality of services provided to the public.
This article will survey some of the components of the current
licensing system and their utility in reaching the goal of lawyer
competence. In a forthcoming article, this author will consider a
theory of licensure and will propose measures that might be taken
in a renewed effort both to define the tasks and the self-governance
needs of lawyering and to more properly relate those tasks and needs
to the public interest.
9. Whether or not entry barriers actually benefit lawyers economically is unknown. They
are believed to do so. That they are maintained, at least in part, with that purpose in mind
is clear. As Leffler notes about physician licensure, the '[e]conomic literature has not
satisfactorily specified the objective function of an occupational cartel." Leffler, Physician
Licensure: Competition and Monopoly in American Medicine, 21 J.L. & ECON. 165, 166
(1978).
10. The defensive posture of the organized bar is in part a response to social and economic
changes for which lawyers are not responsible and over which they perhaps sense failing
control. While lawyers are accustomed to considerable uncertainty, ambiguity, and change
in their work for others, they are not demonstrably comfortable with social changes which
alter the forms in which (and the persons to whom and by whom) legal services are delivered.
New distribution mechanisms such as prepaid legal insurance, group and clinical practice,
government funding, law stores, a wholesale market in services, high volume delivery, do-it-
yourself kits, the use of charge accounts and the like are inconsistent with the traditional
image of the professional dignity of the bar. See generally J. JENKINS, FuTURE LAW: LAWYERS
CONFRONT THE 21sT CENruiy (B.N.A. 1979). Things are simply changing quickly and, for
lawyers, getting out of hand. The 19th century rise to prominance of the profession was
dependent upon an alliance between legal and economic interests which together commercial-
ized American society. M. HoRwrrz, Tim TRANSFORMATION OF AMERicAN LAW 1780-1860, at 140
(1977). There is evidence that the commercial dominance of American life may be giving way.
In the process, American lawyers are losing that ally without which they cannot continue to
exercise traditional controls.
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11. PROFESSIONAL REGULATION-THE MAINTENANCE OF MYTHICAL
STANDARDS
It is part of our economic faith that markets in which competition
operates to reward merit provide the best opportunity for efficient
development and consumption of quality products. We claim that
the public interest is best served when professions" and other com-
mercial endeavors are subjected to state regulation only where, and
to the extent that, it can be demonstrated that intervention is neces-
sary to protect the public health, safety, and welfare from an identi-
fiable harm.' 2 The licensing of lawyers has never been shown to meet
any such standard.
Lawyer licensing exists upon no adequate theoretical or empirical
basis. The "public interest" to which it is constantly rededicated is
either unstated or mistated.' 3 Justification for the public and pri-
vate expenditures involved in licensing, and for the economic ineffi-
ciency created by market control, is sought wholly in sweeping ab-
stractions which cannot be evaluated.'4 The elements of public and
private need, expectation, motive, cost and benefit traditionally
have been treated without the development of any theoretical base.
Although it cannot easily be denied that "the public interest" could
be favored by the provision of a "sufficient" supply of "competent"
legal services at "reasonable cost," none of these terms have recog-
nized content. There is no serviceable definition of "the practice of
11. I assume that lawyering is a "profession." According to Marks & Cathcart, Discipline
Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 193 n.1, a profession
is to be distinguished from an occupation by the former's "assertion of. . authority...
over at least minimum standards of professional conduct and perhaps performance." If this
is so, the practice of law qualifies. If, on the other hand, the mere assertion of authority
without its exercise is insufficient, then lawyering fails to qualify. For articles indispensible
to consideration of this subject, see Carlson, Measuring the Quality of Legal Services: An Idea
Whose Time Has Not Come, 11 L. & Soc'y Rav. 287 (1976); Rosenthal, Evaluating the
Competence of Lawyers, 11 L. & Soc'y Rzv. 257 (1976).
12. See, e.g., Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, ch. 76-168, § 2(1), 1976 Fla. Laws 295 ("That
no profession . . . shall be subject to the state's regulatory power unless the exercise of such
power is necessary to protect the public health, safety, or welfare from significant and discern-
ible harm or damage. The exercise of the state's police power shall be done only to the extent
necessary for that purpose.").
13. Incantatory phrases such as "in the public interest," employed by the bar and the
judiciary, are, standing alone, without substance. As Professor Davis has noted in another
context: "Every legislative body may be assumed to favor the true, the good, and the beauti-
ful, and whether it says so or not is of no consequence." 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw
TREATSE § 2.04 at 87 (1958).
14. Among lawyers, as no doubt among some others, there is a tendency to suppose that
where there is a name for something there is a reality to which it corresponds. One can speak,
as lawyers do, of "the public interest," of "the practice of law," of "competence," and of other
abstractions, but these are maps for which no territories exist. Their usefulness lies in the
comfortable fact that if you don't know where you are going, not only will any road take you
there but no one can claim to have better directions.
1979]
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law," just as there is no accepted understanding of its "competent"
performance or of "reasonable cost." Only a small portion of what
lawyers do is done publicly, that is, performed before those who,
nevertheless, claim to assert regulatory control. We know (more or
less) how many lawyers there are, but that's practically all we know.
We have no idea of how much, or even how, lawyering is done,
because we don't know what lawyering is. If, as is mistakenly as-
sumed by those who rely on courts to monitor the practice, what
lawyers do were an observed phenomenon, there would still be no
standard of performance against which to measure competence;
nonetheless, all serious justifications for the imposition of the public
cost of this monopolized market are bottomed upon claims of main-
taining competent and affordable professional services.' 5
Ill. WHO SEEKS LICENSURE?
There is little if any evidence of public initiative for the licensing
and regulation of lawyers." Licensing and the prohibition against
"unauthorized practice" are promoted as efforts to protect the com-
munity from incompetence and misconduct. 7 Notwithstanding
these promoted justifications, the full energizing effort comes from
the professionals themselves, those who believe that without licen-
sure both they and the public would suffer economic or other depri-
vation. Courts and lawyers alike realize that the public (when not
simply indifferent to or ignorant of licensure) perceives the process
as a method to preserve the economic advantages of the members
15. See generally Marks & Cathcart, supra note 11, at 219. This excellent article is a most
comprehensive review of the relation between lawyer behavior and lawyer discipline.
16. In fact, one is unlikely to discover any instance where an occupational group has
sought out public supervision of its activities. While limited public participation has been
allowed on occasion, there is little evidence that such participation has made professional
regulation more responsive to public needs. Florida, for example, like most other states which
now mandate lay membership on grievance committees, has taken no comparable steps
toward lay participation in the mechanism of admission to the practice. See FLA. SUP. CT.
BAR AnMIss. R. I, § 2.
17. The language of the cases is derivative and incantatory. See, e.g., Florida Bar v.
Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978) ("to protect the public from those who are
willing to give legal advice and render legal service, for their own profit, without being
competent to do so .... ") (Karl, J., concurring specially); State v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587,
595 (Fla. 1962), vacated, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), rev'd for mootness, 159 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1964)
("It is done to protect the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by
unqualified persons. ... ); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Mass. 1943) ("but
in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incom-
petent and unreliable persons. ... ); State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 5 S.E.2d 181, 186 (S.C.
1939) ("but to assure the public adequate protection [from] incompetent and unlearned
persons. ... ); Grievance Comm. State Bar v. Coryell, 190 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Ct. App.
1954) ("to protect the public against persons inexperienced and unlearned in legal matters
.. . )
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of the bar.'8 This perception is largely but not wholly accurate.
While the process definitely does protect the market advantages of
those holding licenses, it may also have other public and practi-
tioner values which the profession has itself ignored.
IV. WHAT IT Is THAT Is BEING LICENSED-THE DRIFTING FENCE
"We can't define lawyering, but we know it should be licensed."' "
It is entirely consistent with the theory of professionalization pro-
posed here and with the exploitation of a captured market that the
legal occupation has escaped all useful definition. 9 The practice of
18. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978), where Justice
Karl, concurring specially, said "[t]here is a popular notion that every attempt to define
the practice of law and restrict the activities within the definition to those who are authorized
to practice law is nothing more than a method of providing economic protection for lawyers."
Cf. Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Mass. 1943) (It is "not in the protection of
the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public .... "); State ex rel. Daniel v.
Wells, 5 S.E.2d 181, 186 (S.C. 1939) (It is "not for the purpose of creating a monopoly in the
legal profession, not for its protection, but to assure the public. ... ); Project, The Unau-
thorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 113-
14 n.42 (reporting the 1976 remarks of the chairman of the A.B.A.'s Committee on Unauthor-
ized Practice of Law to the same effect) [hereinafter cited as An Empirical Analysis].
The Florida Supreme Court suggests that maintaining the monopoly is a public service
made available only through the altruism of the bar. In State v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587 (Fla.
1962), vacated, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), rev'd for mootness, 159 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1964), the court,
without reference to the record, noted:
If the truth be known the unauthorized practice of law by those not qualified and
admitted actually creates work for the legal profession because of the errors and
mistakes of those who for others illegally perform legal work they are not competent
to perform. In this the members of the legal profession gain, but the unfortunate
members of the public who were ill-advised lose, in some instances quite badly.
Id. at 595. In Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978) the same court stated:
Because of the natural tendency of all professions to act in their own self interest,
however, this Court must closely scrutinize all regulations tending to limit competi-
tion in the delivery of legal services to the public, and determine whether or not
such regulations are truly in the public interest.
Id. at 1189.
19. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 11, at 226 n.65.
20. The ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIaILY states that "[iut is neither necessary
nor desirable" to define what it is to which the Code itself relates. Id. at EC 3-5. It is easier
to identify those things people don't do as lawyers than to define lawyering. American lawyers
engage in an almost infinite variety of services for their clients. There is little of business or
commercial life that could not be considered "lawyering." See Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (1976). Even in states
which impose criminal penalties for practicing without a license, e.g., Florida, FLA. STAT. §
454.23 (1977), courts off-handedly acknowledge an inability to define what "it" is. "[Any
attempt to formulate a lasting, all encompassing definition of 'practice of law' is doomed to
failure .... " State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Mich. 1976), quoted with approval in
Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1978). But see State ex rel. Norvel
v. Credit Bureau, 514 P.2d 40 (1973):
indicia of the practice of law, insofar as court proceedings are concerned, include
the following: (1) representation of parties before judicial or administrative bodies,
(2) preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special pro-
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law is what lawyers currently say it is. Trespass on this occupied
territory by unlicensed persons is the public evil said to be avoided
by governmental intervention. This is truly a land of myths and
fogs.
Terms used by courts to discuss those points where public and
guild interests converge (such as "the practice of law," "the public
interest," "incompetent," and "unlearned person") simply have no
meaning; indeed, they are not supposed to have meaning in the
sense of having descriptive or predictive content. Their meaning,
like that of other ceremonial terms, is in their effect. Meanwhile, the
nature, range, and quality of legal services and the private behavior
of lawyers may remain hidden, unstudied, and unmeasured. Both
the scope of this historically omnivorous occupation and the state
of its art remain a mystery to the public, to its practitioners, and
to those who have assumed public responsibility for its governance.
One might look with fair expectation to case and statutory law
dealing with the "unauthorized practice" of law for a definition of
what it is that can be done legally only when licensed. One might
also expect to find there some identification of the harm which
results from the nonlicensed doing of it.2" One would look for a long
ceedings, (3) management of such action and proceeding, and non-court-related
activities such as (4) giving legal advice and counsel, (5) rendering a service that
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill, (6) preparing instruments and contracts
by which legal rights are secured.
Id. at 45 (emphasis added). Five states define "the practice of law" basically as being "what
lawyers do," thereby putting the entire commercial world in jeopardy of licensing laws.
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, UNAUTHORIZED PRAcTicE HANDBOOK 18 (1972). Eight other states
are reported to define lawyering somewhat more restrictively as representing others before
judicial or administrative bodies, regularly advising others on their legal problems for a fee,
and drafting legal documents. Id. at 15-18. Some cases "defining" the practice of law are
collected in R.J. Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d 407, 416 (Okla. 1972). An early ALR annota-
tion, 111 A.L.R. 19, 20-21 (1937), entitled "What Amounts to the Practice of Law," pointed
out that it was "practically impossible to frame any comprehensive and satisfactory defini-
tion" of the practice of law. Supplemental annotations, 125 A.L.R. 1173 (1940) and 151 A.L.R.
781 (1944), did not attempt to define it.
21. It must be remembered that if the bar were able to illustrate any objective harm to
the consumers served by unlicensed practitioners, that demonstration would only tend to
support costly efforts to prohibit unlicensed provision of services. Who speaks for those well
served by the unlicensed or not served at all? Justification of enforced licensure requires at
the least adequate information about the quantity and quality of licensed services and about
the amount of unserviced needs that results from market restriction. Interestingly, although
any natural person may represent himself in court (Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975);
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBILrry EC 3-7) either well or poorly, that same person
cannot obtain the assistance (good or bad) of anyone not a licensed lawyer. This points again
to the theory that the evil being avoided is that done to unknown third parties or to the
community in general. Even if this were a valid argument (hidden dangers to secret persons),
it would call also for a net cost-benefit analysis that has not been made; that is, what
comparable community loss or third party harm results from the current limitation of
services?
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time, because there are few hints in that lamentable collection. The
unlicensed services rendered in individual cases in which govern-
mental censure has been sought are consistently said to have been
performed with competence by the lawyer's own measure. Incom-
petence seems wholly irrelevant to these decisions.2 2 The harm to
which the public is exposed by unlicensed practice is an asser-
tion-it is potential, a convention, a given. Public harm is, further,
a factor in none of the statutes.23 Consequently, neither a serviceable
definition of the craft subject to licensure, nor of the harm of its
being done without a license, can be discovered from the opinions
or the statutes. We know that something bad exists, but it is not
tested against experience. Whatever it is, it results from the condi-
tion of nonlicensure.
Judges, themselves lawyers, called upon to rule in these matters,
use language full of marginal uncertainty; their opinions contain
little if any rational force. They are declaratory, not persuasive.
22. These cases are not brought by complaining customers, they are initiated by lawyers.
In State v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1962), vacated, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), rev'd for mootness,
159 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1964), where there was, as is typical, no injured party, the court noted:
It may be that he is fully competent to practice law, that he has the educational
and other qualifications required of an applicant for admission to the Bar of this
state, and that he is well able to pass the bar examination, but until he had done
so we have no way of assuring the public that he is qualified to practice law in this
state.
Id. at 595 (emphasis added). In Grievance Comm. of the Bar v. Dacey, 222 A.2d 339 (Conn.
1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 683 (1967), the plaintiff bar association was not required
to support allegations that the respondent's practice injured "the public" as such evidence
was "irrelevant." The court noted
[Tihe complaint alleged an injury to the public, not from the fact that Dacey had
practiced law in an incompetent manner or to the particular injury of his clients,
but from the fact that he had practiced law without having satisfied the uniform,
standard, requirements for admission to the bar imposed for the benefit and protec-
tion of the public ....
Id. at 350. See also Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 312 P.2d 998, 1004
(Colo. 1957) (the court stated that because the suit was in behalf of the public, specific
consumer harm need not have been shown).
The Florida Bar's response to interrogatories in Florida Bar v. Furman, 19 FL4. L.W. 202
(Sup. Ct. May 10, 1979) illustrates the standard position of the organized bar in unauthorized
practice cases:
Q: To your knowledge, has any person suffered any legal, economic, personal
or other harm or disability as a result of the Respondent's activities which are the
subject matter of this action.
A: Petitioner [Bar] is unable to furnish the name of any specific person who
has suffered any legal, economic, personal or other harm, as distinguished from that
suffered by the general public from the giving of untrained and erroneous legal
advice by a layman.
Second Interrogatories of Respondent to Petitioner, The Florida Bar, at 3, Florida Bar v.
Furman, 19 FiA. L.W. 202 (Sup. Ct. May 10, 1979) (emphasis added).
23. See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK 6-35
(1972).
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That courts seem defensive, embarrassed, and mystified by the reg-
ulatory process has not lessened their support of it. Eventually,
because they don't understand what is afoot but believe they must
persist, courts settle upon rhetorical screens which substitute for
needed analysis. Most common to the opinions are bare declara-
tions, consistent with our understanding of professionalization, that
licensure and enforcement are justified by the seriousness of the
legal undertaking and the extent of the potential public harm. '4
How that harm is avoided by licensure is never addressed.
V. THE COST OF LAWYER LICENSURE AND' MARKET OCCUPATION-A
PUBLIC TAX
Courts recognize and acknowledge some of the costs associated
with market controls effected through licensure and enforcement.
Most costs are difficult to measure and are ignored: all are painful
to acknowledge. For example, a few able courts have noted that
these barriers impose constraints upon constitutional and other
primary rights of persons who might otherwise either render legal
services or who might purchase such services from nonlicensed
providers.
[A]ny limitations on the free practice of law by all persons neces-
sarily affects important constitutional rights. Our decision here
certainly affects the constitutional rights of Marilyn Brumbaugh
to pursue a lawful occupation or business. . . .Our decision also
affects respondent's First Amendment rights to speak and print
what she chooses. In addition, her customers and potential cus-
tomers have the constitutional right of self representation. . . and
the right of privacy inherent in the marriage relationship. . . .All
citizens in our state are also guaranteed access to our courts by
Article I, Section 21, Florida Constitution (1968).5
24. On occasion, expressions of potential injury from "this dangerous and insidious move-
ment" toward nonlicensed practice reach truly metaphoric heights. In Florida Bar v. Furman,
there are reports of "grave danger to the citizens," of "a chaotic mess [that] will be created
to the detriment of society as a whole." Report of Referee at 57, 60, Florida Bar v. Furman,
19 FLA. L.W. 202 (Sup. Ct. May 10, 1979). The creation of "life-time misery and suffering to
a multitude of people" is foreseen. Id. at 60. "[Ulnder the guise of a small fee, [unlicensed
practice] is leading many innocent people's future into mudholes and quicksand." Id. at 61.
This "unauthorized practice of law, which is a menace to society," must be prevented "to
protect the public from being victimized, damaged, and the suffering [sic] caused by those
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law." Id. at 62. The bar had stipulated that none of
respondent's customers believed they had suffered any damage.
25. Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1978) (citations omitted). It is
at least arguable that, whatever their bona fides, the constitutional rights of citizens should
not be left for their protection to those who appear to profit from their restriction.
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Courts that, as here, emphasize the nonmonetary costs of the
legal monopoly hint at what may be a significant difference between
law and other professions: the control of civic rights not generally
conceded to be subject to market allocation. As we shall note, al-
most everyone who applies to practice law is admitted, law schools
abound, enrollment is relatively open, and the direct capital invest-
ment necessary to obtain the qualifying education is relatively little.
The principal public cost imposed by lawyer regulation is, conse-
quently, probably not the high cost associated with monopoly con-
trol of the supply of those services for which lawyers are trained.
Rather, the public economic cost results from the almost unlimited
scope of the monopoly, that is, from the wide range of activities
brought within an intentionally undefined yet guaranteed market.
Lawyers have captured both socially necessary tasks requiring spe-
cial competence and many other tasks that require neither particu-
lar training nor experience nor special intelligence. The advantages
of this monopoly are obtained by a happy combination of control
over market definition and demand. Persons trained and then li-
censed at high public cost are permitted exclusively to supply the
demand for a wide range of rote, repetitive, essentially clerical tasks
which provide a high return. The control of these captured clerical
tasks is protected by the intimidation of both actual and potential
sanctions for trespass across the undefined and drifting boundaries.
Further nonmonetary costs are, of course, apparent in the restric-
tions imposed, for purposes of professionalization, on public infor-
mational rights such as those recognized in Bates v. State Bar. 6 The
Bates case may point the way to that definition of "lawyering" that
is a necessary first step in establishing boundaries for the profession
and in advancing the public interest in quality services within those
boundaries. Further direct public cost is evident in the probable
price elevation for true legal services, although the legal monopoly's
failure to limit significantly the number of practitioners suggests
that that effect may not be great. 7 Other unmeasured social costs
26. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Some first amendment protection has been afforded commercial
speech at least since Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); accord Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
27. The direct monetary costs of the system relevant to obtaining an uncontested divorce
were considered in An Empirical Analysis, supra note 18, at 153-60. That a limitation on the
number of suppliers of any sought-for service (or a controlled expansion of demand) will both
increase the cost of that service and alter the distribution of income from consumers to those
who are licensed to provide would seem beyond question. See CARROLL STUDY, supra note 8,
at 2. The manner in which such market controls guarantee economic inefficiency in the
performance of nonskilled but included tasks, and the way they give rise to various subter-
fuges and avoidances which require costly policing, requires study that the organized bar has
never instituted.
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are those associated with the nonneutral allocation of public serv-
ices that results from any producer controlled monopoly of those
services. That is, as the legal services market today can be charac-
terized as one of consumer disorganization and ignorance and in-
creasing producer organization (coupled with an unknown elasticity
of demand),2 there results an information imbalance which, when
combined with the socially strategic position of the legal profession,
provides a system in which rights which ought to be universally
available actually are allocated by wealth. 9
This market control system is mandatory, binding both producer
and consumer. The provider's market is limited to those who hold
a state permit. Others may not distribute any "legal" services at
any price, nor of any quality.30 Only those consumers who qualify
by wealth or by governmental fiat can obtain a share of the supply.'
Nothing in the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY limits the right of lawyers to
charge such fees as the consuming public will bear, short of that which the members them-
selves find "clearly excessive." The monetary cost of restrictions on legal information was
considered by the Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The
extensive costs of applicant examination eventually are reimbursed to lawyers by the consum-
ing public in the fees of those who are admitted.
28. To the extent to which it is lawyers themselves who determine clients' needs for
services, the market can be considered as one of managed elasticity. The number of lawyers
demanded seems to depend, as one would expect, inversely on lawyer earnings and directly
on, inter alia, a community's real income. See generally Pashigian, The Number and Earn-
ings of Lawyers: Some Recent Findings, 1978 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 51. The substi-
tution of a prepaid service system for the current fee-for-services system may put the demand
shoe on a different foot. As Professor Friedman notes, the influence of the political concentra-
tion and high interest of members of the profession overcome the politically diverse and
incidental interest of consumers and allows all professions to control the definition of "public
interest" and how it is to be served. M. Famw.mAN, supra note 7, at 143.
29. The rationing of legal services by wealth is a problerii of recognized constitutional
proportions. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (Supreme Court ruled on
due process grounds that it was unconstitutional to deny, for indigency, access to an essential
legal service (divorce) where no other avenue for relief existed); Grissom v. Dade County, 293
So. 2d 59, 61 (Fla. 1974) (Florida Supreme Court extended the Boddie doctrine to include
adoptions, noting that "appellant is precluded from our courts because she cannot 'purchase
jurisdiction' .. .."); accord Deason v. Deason, 296 N.E.2d 229 (N.Y. 1973) (divorce); cf.
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (discharge of debts in bankruptcy is neither a
fundamental nor a constitutional right). Florida judges have, in several contexts, carefully
scrutinized wealth impediments to the state's constitutional right of access to the courts (FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 21). See, e.g., Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 805-06 (Fla. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977) (medical liability mediations panels); G.B.B. Investments, Inc.
v. Hinterkopf, 343 So. 2d 899, 900-01 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Bell v. State, 281 So. 2d
361, 361-62 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (reimbursement to state for certain trial and appeal
costs). The more indirect restrictions on access, imposed by licensure and market ambiguity,
have nothing more to recommend them.
30. Prohibitions, often criminal, on the "unauthorized practice of law" exist in all juris-
dictions. The high income derived from rendering legal services, the need for these services,
and the limited supply of licensed practitioners all encourage an illegal market which, in turn,
requires costly policing.
31. E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gideon
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While the receipt of unlicensed services is not in itself punishable,
consumers who would choose to engage the same or alternative serv-
ices at a different price or quality if rendered by laymen, must or
will forego them. 2 No one is free (as would be the case were lawyers
merely certified) to assume the risk of employing a nonlicensed
lawyer; no one may impose that risk on another by offering "legal
services" without a state license.
Thus the licensing of lawyers and the policing of the cartel carry,
in addition to substantial direct costs, indirect and unmeasured
social costs as well. Unless this system's benefits are merely as-
sumed to outweigh the costs (or unless mere abstract proclamations
of a net addition to the public welfare are to constitute proof), the
nature and extent of the public's gain must be identified and
weighed against those costs. To do less would appear professionally
irresponsible.
VI. How Is THE COST OF LICENSURE JUSTIFIED TODAY?
A. Some Common Justifications
There are several theoretical bases upon which licensure and en-
forcement have been defended as being in the public interest.
Oddly, none of them rely directly on the values of monopoly per se.
That is, an argument which hasn't been made could be made that
barriers which limit supply and guard the boundaries of the market
underwrite the economic health of practitioners and are, therefore,
in the public interest. It is arguable that the economic well-being
of lawyers 33 encourages an independent, virtuous, and courageous
bar which is critical to the maintenance of our free and democratic
society. 34 Possibly because the economic values are uncertain or
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
32. For example, the peculiar problems of the "middle-class majority," which can neither
qualify for government funded services nor afford high fees, were noted in Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 473 n.4 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring). See generally B.
CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS; SOME PROBLEMS OF AVAILABILITY OF
LEGAL SERVICES (1970); Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services For the Middle
Classes, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (1963).
33. The organized bar's interest in the maintenance of a high fee structure is evinced by
its willingness to defend it in court. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S.
576, 577-78 (1971) (in which Justice Black accurately characterized the bar's argument as a
"plea for court protection of unlimited legal fees").
34. The ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble at 1 tells us "[tihe contin-
ued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon recognition of the concept that
justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the individual
...," and that "[l]awyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of
society." This ethics code also states that "[t]he legal profession cannot remain a viable
force in fulfilling its role in our society unless its members receive adequate compensation
for services rendered. ... Id. at EC 2-16. Further, "adequate compensation is necessary
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because this "family farm" theory would suggest an unflattering
relationship between prosperity and courage, the bar and the courts
have only obliquely suggested it.3
Let us review some other common justifications of licensing that
are also easily passed over. Most relate the regulatory process to the
maintenance of competence. There is an argument that market lim-
itations are merely a necessary, if costly, consequence of the other-
wise beneficial mechanism by which they are sustained. This
"means justifies the ends" defense has several variations. One is
that licensure, because of its dependence upon entrance examina-
tions, compels a drawing together of an applicant's entire legal edu-
cation and focuses it to the public's future benefit. This theme is so
pragmatically and educationally dubious that it would have little
currency but for the prestige of those who have played it.30 As we
shall note, entrance examinations are largely unrelated to legal edu-
cation and even more tenuously related to the practice of law; what-
ever is "drawn together" in preparation for them is almost certainly
the wrong stuff. A second subdivision of this argument is that licen-
sure needs examinations and that examinations keep law schools in
line by concentrating on necessaries and maintaining standards;
thus, we must keep licensing to keep examining. Since education for
examination passage is accomplished almost exclusively by com-
mercial bar exam cram courses37 (and legal educators don't equate
high pass rates with academic quality), the influence is likely mini-
mal.
Another defense is what we might call the high hurdles for invisi-
ble runners theory. Relying on a belief in anonymous intimidation,
it claims that a comparison of the number of bar applications sought
with the number of applications actually filed proves the value of
in order to enable the lawyer to serve his client effectively and to preserve the integrity and
independence of the profession." Id. at EC 2-17. "When members of the Bar are induced to
render legal services for inadequate compensation, as a consequence the quality. of the service
rendered may be lowered, the welfare of the profession injured and the administration of
justice made less efficient." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 302 (1967).
See also In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 114-16 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); A. STANSBURY,
REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK 450 (1972) ("The public have almost as deep an
interest in the independence of the bar as of the bench.").
35. The amount of courage to be expected from a profession that historically has organized
itself as an ologopoly and excluded those whose political, social and economic views were at
variance with its own is limited. Collections have been made of those instances where it was
exhibited; e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 99 S. Ct. 698, 705 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting,
perhaps, that it is often pro hac vice virtue, i.e., more easily exercised away from home).
36. See, e.g., Griswold, In Praise of Bar Examinations, 60 A.B.A.J. 81 (1974). But see
Blackmar, Is the Bar Examination an Anachronism?, 60 A.B.A.J. 1240 (1974) (responding to
Griswold). Both seem to argue the wrong issues.
37. See generally Seligman, Why the Bar Exam Should Be Abolished, 8 (no. 7) Jums
DOCTOR 48 (1978).
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licensing as an exclusionary tool. The looming spectors of examina-
tion and character investigation, it is said, deter both unseen crooks
and potential incompetents.18
A third common defense of licensing is that the law involves such
extensive and sensitive negotiation and counseling processes that it
cannot, in the public interest, be left to the untrained. As neither
negotiation nor counseling has been traditionally or centrally a part
of the law curriculum, and as the ability competently to engage in
neither activity is tested on any bar examination, it remains a mys-
tery how those skills become more highly developed among the li-
censed than among the lay public."
A further defense is made that examination and other barriers
guarantee at least minimal competence and, therefore, some degree
of efficiency by those who use limited public resources such as court-
rooms, judicial energy and the like. This argument rests on two
erroneous assumptions-first, that lawyering is done in public, i.e.,
in courtrooms, 0 and second, that licensure is capable of predicting
minimal competence. Even if more soundly based, the public re-
source conservation effect of excluding lay persons cannot be signifi-
cant if we are to accept (as we should not) Chief Justice Warren
Burger's widespread announcements that judges perceive a great
part of the licensed bar to be incompetent."
38. Florida, for example, reports as evidence of the success of its "in-depth character
investigation" program, that requests for application forms exceed the number of applica-
tions filed. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, THE BAR EXAMINERS' HANDBOOK 94
(1968) [hereinafter cited as BAR EXAMINERS]. Florida does not report what all that really
means. This is the magic tea bag theory: "Why do you wear a tea bag around your neck?"
"To avoid arthritis." "But you have arthritis." "Of course, but think how bad it'd be without
the tea bag."
39. Griswold, supra note 36, at 83, notes the significance of the lawyer's role as counselor,
planner, negotiator, draftsman, and advisor; unfortunately, the manner in which bar exami-
nations contribute to either the acquisition or discovery of these skills is not revealed by the
author.
40. While no study of the distribution of lawyering time between offices, courts, public
buildings, and other places is available, it is highly unlikely that more than a small part of
even most trial advocates' work takes place in public facilities. See Rubin, A Causerie on
Lawyers'Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 557, 578 & n.2 (1975) (concluding, on a wholly
informal basis, that fewer than 25% of all lawyers in practice devote a majority of their time
to litigation). To assume that the formalized behavior and ritualized etiquette of public
advocacy is characteristic of lawyer behavior is simply plain error.
41. Burger, A Sick Profession, 42 (no. 5) Wis. B. BULL. 7 (1969) (taken from his 1967
address to the American College of Trial Lawyers). The Chief Justice's "sky is falling"
conclusions appear to have been the renderings of something like informal judicial gossip, far
short of the serious analysis one might expect from the nation's most prominent jurist. See
also Final Report of the Advisory Comm. on Proposed Rules for Admission to Practice, 67
F.R.D. 161 (1975); Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227
(1973); Kaufman, The Court Needs A Friend in Court, 60 A.B.A.J. 175 (1974). A subsequent
empirical examination of judicial perceptions found that the trial bar was perceived by judges
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There is yet another line of defense which, while little more than
an argument for standing based upon a description of actual prac-
tice, comes close to defining one source of high costs in the industry
and hints at the true burdens that licensing imposes on the public.
This is the "no poaching" approach. It derives from several undis-
tinguished cases which speak of lawyers' "property rights" in the
practice, of legal franchises subject to protection from
"encroachment" by the unlicensed.42 The fact that some courts rec-
ognize that a "property right" or a "franchise" once granted needs
protection fails to address the propriety or public advantage in rec-
ognizing either. In fact, it is not the existence but rather the breadth
and the ambiguity of the lawyers' franchise that is flawed and must
be analyzed.
B. The Public Ignorance/Licensure as Information Justification
The most commonly accepted argument for market intervention,
and that which underlies all considered justifications of the preven-
tion of unlicensed practice, is based on a theory of market failure.
This theory, which again turns on the need for consumer protection,
is derived from the assumed intersection of two aspects which are,
as generally competent. Maddi, Trial Advocacy Competence: The Judicial Perspective, 1978
AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 105. A nice tonic to all this "chicken littling" was provided
by Judge Marvin Frankel: "There are no objective measures or tests of lawyers' competence.
Individual impressions collected in relatively casual conversations, reflecting unstated stan-
dards, are disparate to the verge of worthlessness." Frankel, Curing Lawyers' Incompetence:
Primum Non Nocere, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 613, 614-15 (1977).
A more useful and unspoken question is whether judges, in" fact and by definition, are not
arguably in the worst possible position to assess the competence of even trial advocates. Most
if not all inquiries and surveys of judges in this regard fail to distinguish between counsel's
dual obligations of assisting the court to identify and resolve issues on the one hand, and of
client representation on the other. That the two are frequently and perhaps inherently in
conflict is an essential consideration to any analysis of judicial perceptions. Which function
is any particular court evaluating?
If there is any truth in the above beliefs that a high proportion of American trial lawyers
are incompetent, one is compelled to wonder why an almost insurmountable presumption of
competence must be overcome by a criminal defendant claiming inadequate trial representa-
tion. See, e.g., Crowe v. South Dakota, 484 F.2d 1359, 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
927 (1974) ("It is presumed that court-appointed counsel is competent, and a showing must
be made before that presumption can be overcome. . .. After having carefully reviewed the
record in this cause, we are satisfied that appellant has failed to carry his burden of overcom-
ing the presumption of counsel's competency."); United States ex rel. Weber v. Ragen, 176
F.2d 579, 586 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 809 (1949) ("Court-appointed [sic]
counsel was a member of the Peoria Bar in good standing. That is prima facie evidence of
his competency."). The last nonconflict reversal by the Supreme Court for incompetent
counsel was Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 91-94 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Henry
v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
42. See, e.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 312 P.2d 998, 1003-04
(Colo. 1957), and cases collected therein.
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by definition, characteristic of the market for rendition of all profes-
sional services. The first characteristic (or component) is the inevit-
ability of public ignorance; the second is that licensure serves as a
substitute for absent public information. The first determinant
(public ignorance) is now substantially true but in large measure
artificially maintained by the profession; the existence of the second
(licensure as information) is, at best, without any reliable eviden-
tiary support.
According to this argument, it is first to be assumed as an attrib-
ute of the professions, including law, that a free market in the serv-
ices would be incapable of maintaining a socially necessary stan-
dard of performance. The quality of the product would fall below a
level consistent with the general welfare because, it is argued, in
such a market the buyer is too ill-informed to distinguish good from
poor service. As legal knowledge, in common with the special techni-
cal information claimed to be associated with all professions, is by
definition accessible only to the trained, 3 the lay consumer of serv-
ices is unable, in either an absolute or a relative sense, to obtain the
information necessary to evaluate lawyers or lawyering before or
after a service is rendered. Since the consumer is unable to recognize
and to reward merit, the low quality product has as good a competi-
tive position as the high quality product, and occupational rewards
will be allocated upon bases other than quality, i.e., the market will
behave irrationally in an economic sense and harmfully in a social
sense. If one assumes that there is a valid public interest in main-
taining some minimal standard of legal service, as one must because
of the defined importance of the work, the government must inter-
vene with examinations and licensure to bar those who will not meet
minimal competency or performance standards." The consumer
and the social unit thereby are insulated from the hazards (costs)
of incompetence. 5 Let us consider the elements of the first compo-
nent.
43. See Benham & Benham, Regulating Through the Professions: A Perspective on Infor-
mation Control, 18 J.L. & ECON. 421 (1975) (analyzing the subject of professional information
control in optometrics).
44. In the language used by Carlson in his interesting comparison of competency monitor-
ing in medicine and suggested methods for assessing and regulating competence in law, this
is an "input" measure of control: control of the quality of the practitioner upon admission to
practice. Carlson, supra note 11, at 295. Carlson includes academic standards (accreditational
and educational), licensure, and examination in this category. His other categories are
"process measures" (essentially discipline, peer review, and continuing education) and
"output measures" (malpractice litigation). As Carlson notes, input measures assume that
quality is being assured, but do so without measuring it. Id.
45. "A license to practice law is a proclamation by this Court that the holder is one to
whom the public may entrust [all?] professional matters." Integration Rule of the Florida
Bar, Preamble. The Florida Supreme Court has recently rejected its special committee's
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1. The Virtues of the Ignorant Consumer Component
There can be little argument that the public is, for want of infor-
mation, largely unable to rationally compare or assess either lawyers
or the value of their product. To a large extent this disability results
from the high value the organized bar, supported by the judiciary,
has always placed on public ignorance. Knowledge of the law, of
lawyers, and of legal services is the commodity which lawyers con-
trol and which they alone supply to the public; whatever the justifi-
cation, dissemination of this knowledge has been actively and effec-
tively restrained.
Consumers and potential consumers of legal services do vary in
their relative inability to judge the need for service, to assess the
relative quality of lawyers, and to evaluate services." An established
lawyer's reputation for upholding standards of honesty, for main-
taining confidentiality, and for similar character attributes is some-
times available within a group or community. These groups and
communities (ethnic, social, geographic, occupational, trade asso-
ciational and the like) often serve informally to gather and circulate
such service information. Most citizens, however, have little or no
lawyer contact, 7 are not within such a community, or have no con-
tact with a lawyer-using entity; they are denied access even to such
proposal for "qualification procedures" against allegedly unqualified or incompetent lawyers,
finding its present rule for placing an attorney on an "inactive" list for physical or mental
incapacity or other infirmity to be "adequate." In re Supreme Court Special Comm. for
Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures to Amend Integration Rule, Article II and Article XI, 373
So. 2d 1, 4-5 (Fla. 1979). See also Smith v. Superior Court, 440 P.2d 65, 73 (Cal. 1968) ("To
begin with, we observe that the admission of an attorney to the bar establishes that the State
deems him competent to undertake the practice of law before all our courts, in all types of
actions."); Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 917, 1006 ("A basic aspect of a licensing system is the assurance that
every licensee has the basic skills necessary to perform those services for which he is en-
gaged."). Whatever the quality effect on those who become licensed may be, it can have direct
meaning only to those members of the public who can and do employ those lawyers. It is
entirely possible that, even if the quality of public legal services actually rendered were raised,
the total quality of public legal services would decline because of unmet needs, substitution,
and the like.
46. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 370 n.23 (1977) ("The preliminary release of
some of the results of a survey conducted by the ABA Special Committee to Survey Legal
Needs in collaboration with the American Bar Foundation reveals that [in 19761 48.7%
strongly agreed and another 30.2% slightly agreed with the statement that people do not go
to lawyers because they have no way of knowing which lawyers are competent to handle their
particular problems. ABA, Legal Services and the Public, 3 Alternatives 15 (Jan. 1976).").
Business entities, of course, sometimes have very sophisticated information with which to
make very good choices among lawyers. There is no indication, however, that even such
sophisticated consumers of legal services actually make their lawyer-choice decisions upon
quality of performance grounds.
47. The American Bar Association reported in 1976 that 35.8% of the adult population
has never visited an attorney; another 27.9% has visited one only once. 433 U.S. at 376 n.33.
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faulted reputational information. 8 While the ability to determine
whether services are needed and to evaluate the relative quality of
the product provided by the professional will vary somewhat among
individuals and groups, the central and constant characteristic of
that market remains consumer ignorance.
Public inability to identify legal need and to choose rationally
among providers of legal services is a circumstance often lamented
by the bar. 9 It is, however, self-imposed. Access to even such tradi-
tional (and slippery) indicators of professional ability as academic
achievement, continued education, professional honors, guild recog-
nition and the like is made available to only a narrow range of
consumers. 50 Public information about legal services is treated in a
niggardly manner, typically as an element of bar association public
relations rather than as a public service. 5'
Although its public aspirations are to the contrary, the organized
bar has purposefully denied to the public (and substantially to it-
self)12 all information necessary to inform the public of the law and
to permit evaluation of lawyers and their services.5 3 The role of
48. See Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual
Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 438, 440 (1965) (concerning the
"accelerating urbanization of the country and the decline of personal and neighborhood
knowledge of whom to retain as a professional man"). See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465 n.24 (1978) ("Most lay persons are unfamiliar with the law, with how
legal services normally are procurred and with typical arrangements between lawyer and
client."); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 374 n.30 (1977).
49. In the words of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
EC 2-6 Formerly a potential client usually knew the reputations of local lawyers
for competency and integrity and therefore could select a practitioner in whom he
had confidence. This traditional selection process worked well because it was initi-
ated by the client and the choice was an informed one.
EC 2-7 Changed conditions, however, have seriously restricted the effectiveness
of the traditional selection process. Often the reputations of lawyers are not suffi-
ciently known to enable laymen to make intelligent choices. . . .The selection of
legal counsel is particularly difficult for transients, persons moving into new areas,
persons of limited education or means, and others who have little or no contact with
lawyers.
50. See generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 474-76 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring).
51. The Florida Bar budgeted (for 1979) $25,000 for public education and nearly six times
that amount for lobbying the legislature. Address of Chief Justice Arthur J. England, supra
note 2, at 12, col. 3.
52. Professionally imposed limitations on information about practitioners, services, and
fees act to control both the consumer and the members of the profession. Benham & Benham,
supra note 43, at 421-23. Restraints on advertising, on practice methods, on use of names,
and on publication of experience and education qualifications tend to support homogeniza-
tion, to sustain a theory of universal competence, and to prohibit or retard initiation of more
efficient methods of providing professional services.
53. Canon 2 of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY provides: "A Lawyer Should
Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available." EC 2-1
of the Code imposes an aspirational obligation upon lawyers "to facilitate the process of
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lawyers in protecting their specialized knowledge is entirely consis-
tent with our understanding of the symbolic importance to all pro-
fessions of a belief in a body of arcane and technical information
available only to the initiates. Lawyers are by law required to as-
sume a faceless posture of universal competence and passive availa-
bility. Any public relaxation of this posture has subjected offending
lawyers to randomly imposed forms of professional discipline. All
economic incentives to fulfill the public information obligations of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, i.e., to make legal informa-
tion publicly available, are forbidden.54 Even that limited training
and experience information that may be made available to other
lawyers has not been made available to the public." Oblique efforts
by the organized bar to give the appearance of compliance with
expressed obligations have had little success. For example, lawyer
referral systems operated, organized or approved by the bar,
avowedly with the purpose of complying with the profession's obli-
gation to inform the public and make legal services readily avail-
able, are commonly nothing more than new-lawyer employment
agencies. They do not evaluate attorneys and they rarely, if ever,
establih any experience levels as a prerequisite for placement on a
referral list." Only recently, and over the organized bar's strenuous
argument that such activity would be "unprofessional," have fed-
eral courts struck down bar prohibitions on limited price advertis-
ing57 and associational exchange of legal service information. 8 In
intelligent selection of lawyers. ... These nonmandatory expressions of good faith are
followed by a series of disciplinary rules prohibiting their accomplishment. In addition, all
forms of direct or indirect public communication that would inform the public of a lawyer's
ability or experience have been directly forbidden. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-101.
54. For example, a lawyer who offers unsolicited advice to one not already a client that
legal services are in order, traditionally has been prohibited from then representing that
person. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A).
55. CARROL STUDY, supra note 8, app. II at 2 n.3. The uncertain rating system published
by the MARTINDALE-HUBBLE LAW DiREcTORY while found in some public libraries, is generally
available only to other lawyers and those in contact with lawyers.
56. Anyone who seeks a lawyer through a bar referral service is almost guaranteed to be
referred to one both inexperienced and in need of work.
57. In Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the Court held that bar-imposed prohibi-
tions against lawyer advertising of fees for routine legal services violated first amendment
speech guarantees. Id. at 384. The American Bar Association, the state bars of California,
Virginia, Maryland and North Carolina, and the American Medical, Dental, Optometric, and
Veterinary Medical Associations entered the case as amici curiae, urging continued secrecy
"in the public interest." Bates, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 1262.
58. Collective association for the purpose of exchanging meaningful and economical infor-
mation about legal services, long prohibited by the organized bar "in the public interest,"
was found to be a constitutionally protected activity in United Transp. Union v. State Bar,
401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217
(1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964)
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sum, the bar, while denying the fact, has so thoroughly insisted on
the benefits of public ignorance that its activities have come into
collision with fundamental public statutory and constitutional
rights. Public ignorance has been enshrined as legal ethics.
The true complexities of some kinds of legal problems, and the
information-possessive activities of the organized bar, have made it
virtually impossible for the majority of individual consumers of
legal services to evaluate lawyers or the quality of their services,
either before or after rendition. Thus the first requirement of the
consumer protection theory of intervention through licensing is
founded in present fact. The legal market is characterized by con-
sumers unable to identify and classify either product or producer by
quality.5 1 It is reasonable to presume that such a market might well
tend to nurture substandard performance and expose the public to
intolerable risks of incompetence.
2. Government Intervention as Information Substitute-A Co-
ordinate Myth of Professionalization
The theory's second aspect is belief that the interposition of gov-
ernmental licensure between producers and consumers insulates the
community from the risks of public ignorance by acting as a substi-
tute for absent consumer information. Public benefits flow from the
governmental interposition of the protective shield of examination
between the ignorant consuming public and those who would pro-
vide substandard legal services. The utility of licensure thus lies in
its culling function; it simply bars, (as do prohibitions on lay prac-
tice) substandard producers from the market. Subsequently, profes-
sional discipline operates to correct errors made during the licensing
process. The entire regulatory process, as a substitute for informa-
tion, ensures that all who are licensed are competent. Licensure,
(the American Bar Association, 45 state bar associations, and 4 major local bar associations
joined in a petition for rehearing in support of continued prohibition on such informational
activity).
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court held that the combined
use of the Virginia bar's minimum fee schedule and its disciplinary procedures so restricted
the market in legal services as to violate the federal antitrust laws. The American Bar
Association, the National Organization of Bar Counsel, the state bars of Texas and Wiscon-
sin, the Bar Association of San Francisco, and the American Dental Association each filed
an amicus brief urging the Court to approve the continued use of minimum fee schedules.
Id. at 775 n.*.
59. See generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1979); Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 398 (1977) (Justice Powell, dissenting in part and concurring in part,
gave "the organized bar" credit for recognizing these problems and for implementing innova-
tive measures to correct them. His doing so suggests a failure to distinguish between the
authority and function of the American Bar Association, of which he is a past president, and
the functions and activities of state and local bar associations.).
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consequently, is competence." The significant individual and social
risks which would result from consumer error are thus prevented
where, as in law, the cost of information is seen either to be infinite
(i.e., the data are unavailable) or excessive (i.e., the cost of the data
appears to exceed the cost of error)."' Low quality consumption is
made unavailable by prohibiting low quality production. With li-
censure and discipline, the consumer has no "quality" choice to
make;62 the only choice is from among competent producers. Such
choices may safely be made, as they routinely are, on nonquality
grounds. Even adjusting these assertions downward from the abso-
lutes just stated, is any of this true?
The ability to provide absolute consumer protection is, of course,
not claimed. A system which guaranteed safe consumption of legal
services would be prohibitively expensive, for there is a theoretical
point where a further increase in the quality of available service
would be more costly to guarantee than the benefits it could confer.
The desired level of quality maintenance is reached (and additional
governmental intervention is accordingly unjustified) when a mar-
ginal increase in the "standard" no longer increases the welfare of
some enough to compensate for the loss to others. 3 The licensure,
examination, and disciplinary processes are thought to work to-
gether toward reaching that optimal point. The necessary inquiry
therefore concerns whether or not a cost-benefit equation relevant
to this discussion can possibly be drawn. If so, how do we determine
whether the limits of legal monopoly and of self-disciplining licen-
sure are coextensive with the public "competence" interests they
60. It is this equation that presents the ethical problem to the professional. It is known
to be valid only in a symbolic sense. How does one locate the lines between symbolic truth,
self-deception, and misleading the public?
61. A subsequent part of this article, to be published in a later issue of this Review, will
explore some consequences of the failure to differentiate among legal tasks, i.e., to distinguish
between those jobs which, for individual or community interests, may indeed require techni-
cal competence even at high cost, and those which are rote, routine, and repetitive, which
require but slight skill and information, which are relatively risk-free to the individual and
community, and for which no high competency cost can be justified. The latter tasks consti-
tute a large part of what lawyers do and ought to be identified as not lawyering at all; they
should be decisionally released from the monopoly market.
62. It is important to note that if "quality" means, as it seems to, "adherence to a
recognized standard of performance," the justification ball game is over. No accepted stan-
dards exist for the practice of law. One of the useful characteristics of an abstraction used as
justification for action is that the action cannot thereafter be evaluated by reference to
anything else.
63. In any such analysis, a distinction must be drawn between the quality of services
actually rendered and the level of utilization of services. It is entirely possible to provide a
very few high quality services. The cost of unfulfilled needs for service-of whatever qual-
ity-is, however, a social cost which should not be disregarded in assessing the cost of poorly
delivered service. The question that must be answered is, can poor quality service add value?
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claim to serve? 4
If we proceed as if a cost-benefit analysis were possible, evalua-
tion of the benefits of licensure as an informational device (in the
sense we have discussed it) can sensibly begin by considering
whether examination-based licensure actually relates positively to
the quality of legal services. 5 If licensure and its enforcement can-
not be shown to be positively related to quality of service, then
licensure cannot be justified according to this theory. The crucial
question is: Do we know if substandard producers are identified and
prohibited from entering the market by examination-based licen-
sure or from continuing in the market by organizational discipline?
VII. DOES LICENSURE Do ITS ASSIGNED TASK?
There is no good information one way or the other; however, the
sparse information which does exist not only fails to support the
claims made for licensure, but also suggests (consistent with the
ceremonial nature of the process) that neither courts nor lawyers
believe what they say about it. A controlled analysis is impossible
because the quality of services rendered by illegally practicing indi-
viduals cannot directly be compared with the quality of licensed
services." Although enforcement against unlicensed practice may
be justified on the ground that unlicensed persons have not been
tested for competence, the competence of licensed lawyers is never
64. Such an evaluation cannot be made in our current ignorance. For example, consider-
ing only the narrow matter of technical skill to achieve a routine legal task of some import-
ance-say, residential conveyancing or obtaining a change of name-if we postulate that the
services rendered by those who are licensed are vastly superior to the services that would be
rendered by nonlicensed providers, the cost of unlicensed service becomes high, and substan-
tial governmental intervention appears appropriate. If we postulate only a moderate differen-
tial in the quality of service, then intervention, at the same cost, can be defended less easily
or not at all. If, for any particular "legal" job, we are unable to support any hypothesis with
evidence one way or the other, the values evaporate and the cost imposed by retaining that
service within the captured market cannot be justified. When we introduce the empirical
probability that some laypersons could perform any given "legal" task with greater skill than
would some lawyers, the difficulty of justifying licensure by creating a competence-cost calcu-
lus becomes more complex.
65. For a somewhat similar discussion of the effect of information control in market
management in the optometrics field, see Benham & Benham, supra note 41 (although the
situations of the two occupations are in many other respects dissimilar).
66. The data available here consist exclusively of court decisions involving the unauthor-
ized practice of law. All appear to point out that there is no relative defect in the quality of
service between that provided by unlicensed persons and that provided by licensed practition-
ers. Since there is no available information about the state of the art among those who are
licensed, any comparative judgment would have to be airy indeed. Even if such a comparison
could be drawn between the competence levels of those two populations, and the unlicensed
were found to be less qualified, there still would be no reason to believe that those who
practice without a license are the same people who are excluded by entry barriers or are
removed by internal discipline.
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evaluated. The idea of "competence" is itself an abstraction not
subject to measurement or application. One might inquire whether
there is any evidence that the services provided by those legally in
practice who have never been examined are qualitatively different
from services provided by those legally in practice who have been
examined. Because many states have instituted current examina-
tion procedures only recently, significant numbers of practicing law-
yers have never undertaken anything comparable to a modern bar
examination; 7 those in practice at the effective date of new exami-
nation requirements were universally grandfathered into the bar.
No state, insofar as can be determined, has ever considered limiting
the practice of such nonexamined practitioners, persons who no
doubt include some of the most able and honored members of the
bar and of the judiciary. Five states still require no examination of
graduates of their own accredited, in-state, law schools. 8 There is
no evidence that the quality of legal services rendered in those
states-by these untested graduates-is different from that of ex-
amined and licensed practitioners there or elsewhere." Moreover,
there is no evidence that the legal services in jurisdictions that do
not require examination of all practitioners are qualitatively any
different from those provided in examination states. Thus the bar
and the judiciary provide one useful-if private-response to our
question, i.e., that the profession's own internal perception is that
the licensing process is unrelated to competency. 0
While there is undoubtedly some evidence of individual and, ar-
guably, social harm which may result from the rendition (by whom-
ever) of inadequate or incompetent legal services, evidence that the
system of examination and licensing (and concomitant enforcement
67. Florida, for example, extended a "diploma privilege" to graduates of its law schools
until 1953. Prior to 1953, the overwhelming majority of lawyers were admitted without exami-
nation: between 1949 and 1953, only 352 of the 2,725 newly licensed lawyers were examined.
Watts, Current Status of Admissions in Florida, 23 B. EXAmum 99, 101 (1954). If we assume
the average admittee's age in 1953 at 25 years, it is not unreasonable, even with foreign influx,
to posit that over 75% of Florida lawyers now over the age of 50 were admitted without
"qualifying" examination.
68. See BAR/BRI, NATIONAL B~a EXAMINATION DIGEST 3-35 (1979).
69. Interestingly, while the CARROLL STDY, supra note 8, attempts a tentative ranking of
the states (as regards the quality of legal services provided in each) and sees some evidence
of a positive correlation between strict or restrictive licensing and lawyer competence, it
expresses no negative quality correlation between states with "diploma privilege" admissions
and those requiring all applicants to be examined; for example, Wisconsin, a diploma privi-
lege state, "ranks" sixth out of fifty in the competence sweepstakes. CARROLL STUDY, supra
note 8, app. II, at 4, table 1. Cross-jurisdictional comparisons may not be useful where a
profession is strongly entrenched and employs a uniform, national code of ethics to control
its members.
70. An alternate explanation of grandfathering is that bar politics have been permitted
to overcome the public interest in this respect.
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of prohibitions against lay practice) has any limiting effect on that
harm is entirely absent." The reason lies largely in the ritualistic
nature and purpose of the examination process.
A. Bar Examinations-A Public Ritual
Entrance requirements for the practice of law should be shaped
to identify those who, by reason of ability and character, can be
predicted to supply those lawyering services which are and will be
required, and to identify those who will do so in a competent man-
ner. Current bar examinations, by their nature, are inherently in-
capable of doing either the culling or the educating job claimed for
them." They do have value, but assertions that examinations will
screen from the practice those who are unable or unwilling to pass
them, and that there is some positive correlation between those
excluded persons and the substandard quality of service such per-
sons would have provided, cannot be established.13 There simply is
no evidence that those who are licensed will provide at least mini-
mally adequate service or that the consumer may, with reasonable
71. One need not go so far as Leon Green's 1939 view that bar examinations "produce
results pernicious in the extreme." Green, Why Bar Examinations?, 33 Nw. U.L. REv. 908,
912 (1939). It is more easily arguable that licensure carries excessive public cost, is highly
misleading to laymen and practitioners, and has a pernicious diversionary effect. Lawyers
become so distracted in defending a system of apparent quality control with which they are
comfortable that they fail to develop a good one.
72. Examination and licensure are only the final barriers to practice. Permission to sit
for the examination is dependent upon prolonged education which is unavailable to many.
The social and economic culling for the profession begins at a very young age and extends
throughout almost twenty years of formal education. Thereafter the successful emergent must
establish his "character and fitness," i.e., that he has not participated in "social deviation"
and that his "ideological holdings" are not questionable. It is not difficult to understand why
lawyers by and large find themselves among their intellectual and social peers when repre-
senting a fairly narrow range of propertied interests.
73. The findings of this study clearly indicate that the reason for the adoption
of the written bar examination requirement was protection of the public from harm
occasioned by incompetent practitioners.
Since the risk of such harm not only still exists, but actually is even greater today,
and since assurance of protection of the public from the incompetent is still a vital
responsibility of the bench and bar, this reason for the adoption of the written bar
examination as the basic testing device for admission to the bar remains valid and
persuasive. Furthermore, no alternative to the written bar examination has yet
been devised which gives the essential assurance of basic competency at a price
either society or legal education is, or should be, willing to pay. Accordingly, it is
recommended that the Association of American Law Schools continue its support
of the American Bar Association Standard "that graduation from a law school
should not alone confer the right of admission to the bar, and that every candidate
for admission to the bar should be examined by public authority to determine his
fitness for admission.
AssOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, B. EXAMINATION STUDY PROJECT FINAL REPORT 3
(1976) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
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safety, engage any licensed practitioner for any service. Bar exami-
nations and licensure are not even designed to do that job.74
Current examinations are geared, perhaps by necessity, to locate
the competent notary. They by and large test applicants for reten-
tion of information of the sort one expects to be known by clerks and
technicians. In other words, they test for knowledge of that sort of
information which enables one to accomplish easy, rote and routine
procedures. Basically exercises in the naming of parts, simple
"issue" spotting, and the application of "buzz words," they rein-
force the wholly nonprofessional phenomenon of "professional as
test taker" and "lawyer as plumber. 7 5 The material tested is not
only highly unrelated to the practice, it is also misleading in its
inadvertent suggestions about professional behavior itself.7" Short-
term retention and recognition of bits of factual and procedural
data, words, phrases, and simplistic problem solving are tested
through extensive multiple choice77 and (alleged) essay questions."
74. While it is sometimes asserted that bar examinations do not test for competence, but
rather for incompetence, the distinction-while on the surface facile-is a verbal avoidance.
Either expression of objective is wholly without criteria.
75. See Twining, Pericles and the Plumber, 83 L.Q. REv. 396, 397-98 (1967) (The plumber
is one who has "no-nonsense specialized training to make him a competent technician."). See
also Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977
B.Y.U. L. REV. 695, 928-31.
76. Current efforts to correlate bar examination subject matter with the kind of problems
lawyers will, in the public interest, be called upon to resolve are in the "vast majority" of
cases based upon nothing more than the personal experiences of individual bar examiners.
FI.NA REPORT, supra note 73, Memorandum no. 9, at 9. The degree to which the "personal
experiences" of the members of such examining boards could be expected to reflect the
current, much less the potential, variety of practice within their jurisdictions is unstudied.
Members of boards of bar examiners-like judges, authors of professional codes, teachers, and
other persons occupying prestigious chairs within professions-in the main reflect a reasona-
bly narrow socioeconomic experience. Research supported by the American Bar Foundation
has made it evident that data can be developed from which the current incidence of legal
problems can be measured and the need for various legal services adequately predicted for a
given population. See Avichai, Trends in the Incidence of Legal Problems and in the Use of
Lawyers, 1978 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 289 (using data developed by B. CURRAN, THE
LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUaLC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY (1977)).
77. While it can be asserted that state examinations at least drill applicants on some
peculiar aspects of local law, the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) can claim no such
advantage. Bar examiners, responding to large numbers of applicants, had the Educational
Testing Service produce this examination. See Pashingion, The Market for Lawyers: The
Determinants of the Demand for and Supply of Lawyers, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 53, 53 (1977). Today
it is used in over 40 states. It consists of one six-hour (two hundred multiple choice questions)
exam. The test covers six "topics": contracts, criminal law, constitutional law, evidence,
property, and torts. Success is achieved by the reduction and memorization of relevant fields
of law to a few pages of rote rules. See generally Seligman, supra note 37. The HARCOURT,
BRACE, JAVONOVICH, BAR/BRI BAR REvIEw, characterized accurately by Seligman as the Gen-
eral Motors of Reviews, has an outline that, for examination purposes, adequately covers the
law of "sales" in 22 pages, "secured transactions" in 11, and "real property" in 45. Outlines
published by commercial bar review organizations are now filtering back into law schools as
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Such examinations can, naturally, measure present retention of in-
formation useful in performing structured, routine procedures which
lack the substance, ambiguities, and uncertainty which are identi-
fying characteristics of the lawyer's professional life. As designed,
however, they do not test for the judgment, motivation, commit-
ment, capacity for concrete and abstract thought or expression, or
analytic ability which constitute the materials necessary to ade-
quate lawyering.1' They are not halfway measures compelled by
circumstance; they are the wrong measures.
Bar examinations are, of course, unrelated to competent perform-
ance and are directly misleading in another sense; they fail to in-
clude for testing any material whatever relating to entire areas of
law. These examinations typically ignore, inter alia, poverty law,
international law, labor law, the law of employment discrimination,
patents, copyrights, and environmental law. They rarely touch on
either administrative procedure or the law of federal taxation. Igno-
rance of any one of these subjects virtually guarantees the provision
of substandard services. Insofar as such examinations continue to
be held out as identifying the minimum information necessary to
the practice, and to the extent they affect law student choice of
courses, they are entirely misleading. Furthermore, the examination
cannot fairly be validated against experience. No such test can be
validated without adequate knowledge of the populations involved
and the goals sought; in law, both are unknowns. Forms of external
validation to which job-competence examinations should be sub-
jected are not and cannot be employed because the test is pass-fail,
the tasks to be performed have not been identified, and there exists
no recognized concept of minimum competence.
The examination and investigation procedure is nonetheless said
study aids, so that legal education itself has become infected with the mechanical naming of
parts necessary to pass these examinations.
Aside from signaling a misapprehension of the nature of professional activity, the MBE is
otherwise fundamentally flawed in its attempt to examine for "national" law. The test is
dependent upon terminology, forms, and purported analysis of nationwide validity. There are
few legal matters, aside from the most primitive concepts, which can fairly be said to hold
true and to hold still long enough for such testing; thus, the ambiguous or the changing law
must be ignored. A fair examination of the included (i.e., static) items would be subject to
an almost universal first-time success rate. Because tests, by definition, must discriminate
among test takers, the authors of the MBE have been forced to introduce difficulty into the
form of the questioning, e.g., to use successive double negatives, improbably convoluted and
absurd fact situations, pattern switching and the like. This insures some credible failure rate.
While these techniques are asserted to test "analytic ability," in fact they measure test taking
skill.
78. The number of examinees and the time constraints imposed on grading suggest that
the so called "essay" examinations are themselves graded on little more than a keyed,
multiple-choice, or "buzz word" basis.
79. See generally In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 186 So. 280, 287 (Fla. 1938).
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to be "intended to insure some level of initial competence and moral
character among the membership. 8 0 There is, however, no evidence
that this intention is serious enough to engage the rational attention
of the organized bar."' As, by definition, a profession is a limited
access occupation, the existence of entrance barriers must be pub-
licly asserted. The bar examination performs that function.
All this is not to say that entrance examinations fail to discourage
or prevent some people from entering the legal services market.
Some of those people are no doubt by reason of intelligence or infor-
mation unfit to practice law. Probably some are fit for very little at
all.82 There is, however, no information available about the compe-
tence or behavior patterns of the population excluded by examina-
tion; they are effectively anonymous, and they are posited to be
incompetent. There is also no such information available about the
80. Steele & Nimmer, supra note 45, at 922. See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 73, app.
at 273-74 n.17 (containing the statements of established practitioners, retired judges and the
like of various explanations of the purpose of bar examinations). This FINAL REPORT (the
proposal for which was far more ambitious than the final product) contains interesting data.
In large measure the "examination effect" is studied for its retro-impact on law school curric-
ulum and law student choice. There seems little question but that to one degree or another
law schools and law students are aware of and anticipate bar examinations and respond to
their presence. This recognition has, of course, no demonstrable effect on the quality of legal
practice, and is entirely misleading with regard to the nature of professional activities.
81. The so called "character and fitness" investigations of state bars range from casual
interviews to privacy-invading background searches. Since their validity depends upon the
acceptance of the virtues of correct belief, these tawdry exercises are subject to the derision
of those who are exposed to them and defended chiefly by those whose status has become
engaged in the process. Carlin notes, for example, that in New York, "character and fitness"
defaults caused rejection of approximately .03% of all applicants. J. CARLIN, LAwYERs' ETH-
ics: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK Crry BAR 163 n.1 (1966). At what cost in money and dignity?
Florida, which takes pride in its "comprehensive system of character investigation," is
reported to have developed over the years extensive data, contained in "suspense files," which
are said to be particularly useful "in matters of social deviation." BAR EXAmmNEs, supra note
38, at 90-91. The files contain information received anonymously, through "neighborhood
investigations," by "infiltration," and as a consequence of "both loose and close surveil-
lance." Id. at 91-92. In other words, determinations about "character" are based on hearsay,
half-truths, suggestions, arrest reports, neighborhood gossip about personal habits, and im-
pressionistic moral and lifestyle evaluations. "Probably the most time consuming investiga-
tions are those where the applicant's ideological holdings are in question." Id. at 93. To read
the examiners' handbook is to cringe for any genuine concept of privacy. For all this, Florida
compiles no information to show how many persons are actually denied admission for
"character and fitness" disqualification. Letter from John H. Moore, Executive Director,
Florida Board of Bar Examiners to Robert H. Kennedy (Oct. 17, 1978). The organized bar's
increasing willingness to bludgeon the values for which the rule of law is supposed to stand,
and law students' placid acquiescence in these exercises, suggests that our liberties may be
wrongly entrusted indeed. The typical answer to objections to this wholesale assault is to rely
upon the discredited right/privilege distinction or upon a recitation of individual instances
when terrible people were almost admitted.
82. Every character and fitness board can point to the discovery of some thieves, rapists,
and other bad actors who would arguably be unfit to practice law. Every bar association can
also point to some of its members who have engaged in equaly distasteful activities.
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lawyer population, which is posited to be competent. The distin-
guishing characteristic is licensure: licensure means competence."
The examination process does, to some extent, delay admission
to the market of individuals in each new generation of producers;
many persons are licensed only after initial failure or a series of
failures on the examination. Virtually all graduates, however, are
eventually admitted.8' One would have to suspend reason to believe
that the interval between initial failure and eventual success is em-
ployed in gaining professional competence of any lifetime value. On
the contrary, all our experience indicates that the time is spent
gaining competence in examination techniques. 5
In fact, the American legal system operates with something indis-
tinguishable from a national diploma privilege; that a few people
are excluded serves ceremonial purposes but is an event of no other
social significance. Some states, for example, keep no records to
determine the actual pass rate, i.e., the percentage of applicants
who, once having taken the examination, eventually do pass it."5 In
those states it is evident that the licensing process serves no known,
nonceremonial purpose other than to delay the entrance of new
producers. Its ceremonial aspect reassures both the public and the
initiates of the professionalization of the occupation.
There is yet a further well-recognized element of magical thinking
in the use of entrance examinations and "character" evaluations in
most licensed professions, including law: they relate only to entry.
Once licensed, practitioners are subjected to no retesting or contin-
ued monitoring of competence or character.8 1 Whatever may be the
83. It is, of course, no defense of examination and licensure barriers to note that law
schools graduate some people who probably shouldn't be lawyers. Licensure cannot be shown
to identify them nor to bar or limit their entry. It is, likewise, no answer to ask rhetorically,
"You wouldn't just let anyone practice law, would you?" unless it can be demonstrated that
those whom one would not just let in are currently excluded. Today, as noted, almost all who
try are eventually licensed. Whatever culling takes place occurs at some point earlier than
bar examination and licensure.
84. It has been asserted that about 98% of graduates of accredited law schools who take
bar examinations ultimately pass and are licensed. Seligman, supra note 37, at 50. The
National Conference of Bar Examiners reported in 1968 that although 2/3 of the examinees
pass on their initial try, 85-90% of all applicants eventually pass the examination. BAR
EXAMINERS, supra note 38, at 17-18. Whatever the number actually excluded, it is apparently
small and its membership unstudied. Though we know little about the competence of those
actually licensed to practice, we know even less about those who are denied a license.
85. Contra, BAR EXAMINERS, supra note 38, at 18 (The "strenuous preparation" required
for the examination will "raise the level of competence" of those who initially failed the exam.
How that magic happens is not reported.).
86. Florida, for all its aggressive testing system, does not maintain such information. It
is consistent with the maintenance of professional status that knowing the results of the
process is unnecessary. Such information would be quite meaningless. It is the act of exclud-
ing, the appearance of screening, that alone is significant.
87. See Marks & Cathcart, supra note 11, at 195 ("[AII semblance of following the
19791
630 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:601
elements of "competence" and "character" thought to be revealed
through the admission process, they are held to be so valid and
immutable that they persist through all social, legal, and personal
changes of the licensee's lifetime.8
In sum, the evidence utilized to justify licensure through both bar
examinations and the prohibition of lay practice as quality control
mechanisms is either too meager to be relied upon or nonexistent.
All of this has been made clear before; there is no controversy about
-the condition of the evidence. Nonetheless, both bar and judiciary
defend imposition of the substantial public costs of the process as
necessary for the maintenance of "quality" legal services.
Let us assume the evidence, however, and agree for the sake of
argument that examination and licensure are reasonably related to
insuring competence. Clearly we cannot also assume that there is a
perfect culling of the incompetents or that, once licensed, some
lawyers won't change, i.e., become incompetent ex post licensure,
so to speak. It is for these circumstances that costly professional
self-disciplinary systems have been established. How well do they
relate to the public interest in the delivery of competent legal
services? The evidence suggests a minimal relationship.
B. Disciplinary Systems
After three years of studying lawyer discipline throughout the
country, this Committee must report the existence of a scandalous
situation that requires the immediate attention of the profession.
With few exceptions, the prevailing attitude of lawyers toward
disciplinary enforcement ranges from apathy to outright hostility.
Disciplinary action is practically nonexistent in many jurisdic-
licensing rationale [protection of the public from unethical and substandard performance]
disappears once the license has been issued."); Steele & Nimmer, supra note 45, at 930
("Traditionally, control of professional competence has been limited to establishing and
enforcing prerequisites for entry into the profession. The implicit assumption has been that
meeting these prerequisites establishes not only initial but also perpetual competence in all
areas of legal practice.").
88. Various recertification and continuing education proposals have been made. Recertifi-
cation is nowhere required. According to Steele & Nimmer, supra note 45, at 930 n.22, at least
two states (Iowa and Minnesota) do require "continuing education." In light of the organized
bar's asserted belief in the efficacy of examinations, it is notable that Continuing Legal
Education (CLE) programs require only attendance. As Judge Kaufman has noted, a passing
CLE grade is "present." Some states, such as Florida, while rejecting specialization, have
instituted plans which require a lawyer to engage in "continuing education" of varied quality
as a prerequisite to public "designation" of areas of practice. This hesitant system, unfortun-
ately, will avoid imposition on lawyers of the potential liabilities that would attach to a failure
to exercise care as a "specialist," while misleading the public to confuse "designation" with
"specialization." The reach of the plan is signified by the fact that no lawyer is precluded by
Florida from offering any service in any area of practice-whether "designated" or not.
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tions; practices and procedures are antiquated; many disciplinary
agencies have little power to take effective steps against malefac-
tors. 81
Current disciplinary systems are known to be principally sym-
bolic.9 0 They relate not to incompetence, but to a narrow range of
quite different kinds of misbehavior. The bar and judiciary recog-
nize that which is obvious; there are lawyers whose conduct is such
that it warrants professional discipline. Incompetence, short of that
which is visibly shocking, is not a category. The conduct inquired
into by "grievance" committees and which forms the basis for disci-
pline is not related to any minimum standard of performance.' The
formal complaint system upon which virtually all lawyer discipline
is based is notoriously unable to identify even that socially insignifi-
cant range of misbehavior to which it is exclusively addressed. It
pretends to consider, yet in actuality entirely ignores, questions of
competence (except insofar as "incompetence" may be translated
into bad conduct or subsumed for record-keeping purposes within
such ambiguous categories as "neglect"). Systems for the receipt,
recording, and processing of complaints and for disciplinary action
are based on concepts of fault; there is no category for poor quality."
Before examining the effect of the bar's formal disciplinary system
on the maintenance of lawyer competence, we may first inquire into
the existence of any informal market mechanisms which, it is some-
times asserted, tend to protect the public from substandard legal
services.
1. There Are No Significant Informal Controls on ServiceQuality
Some unstudied effect on service quality no doubt exists from
client reactions to lawyers, for both satisfied and dissatisfied clients
voice opinions that may affect a lawyer's business. However, this
client-based anecdotal system relies upon evaluations made by per-
sons who, for the most part, are too ignorant to fairly evaluate
89. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITrTE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY EN-
FORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (1970) (Tom C.
Clark, chairman) [hereinafter cited as CLARK REPOr]. For an able review of the impact of
the CLARK REPORT, see Steele & Nimmer, supra note 45, at 933-46.
90. The disciplinary system is autonomous-the members of the profession assume au-
thority to determine behavioral norms and the circumstances of deviance subject to inquiry;
the members also determine the nature and degree of discipline, if any, to be imposed.
91. That it could be is clear from ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101,
which clearly obligates a lawyer to provide "competent services."
92. J. CARLIN, supra note 81, at 53, does not include "competence" as a factor in his
otherwise interesting "ethical behavior index."
1979]
632 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:601
professional performance. While Marks and Cathcart urge that this
process will act as "some market check on the nature of services
rendered," 3 even that limited optimism seems quite unwarranted
in a silent market where demand is substantial. Both dishonest
lawyers and incompetent but honest ones may have happy clients.
Happy clients do not complain.94
The informal reputation effect within the guild is no more de-
pendable. Lawyers, in time, gain professional reputations within a
legal community, or within some segment of it, based upon their
colleagues' perception of them. These reputations probably have
some economic consequences with regard to ease of professional
relationships, mobility of employment, and referral of clients. Fur-
ther, as noted above, some laymen will have sufficient contact with
lawyers to gain secondhand knowledge of these peer group views and
this, perhaps, may affect business. Unfortunately, such reputations
are based in large measure on considerations quite different from
those that might define quality of service; usually they are bottomed
upon anecdotal material and treatment of fellow lawyers. Even
where they do exist, they can have little or no market effect on new
lawyers, on professionally isolated practitioners, and on those whose
reputations are derived principally from past ability, the club, the
law firm, or the church with which they are associated.
The better question is whether this asserted market effect of
client-based or peer-based reputation ever serves to identify and
remove the "substandard" producer. It does not. If it did, the public
interest in quality could be left largely to fend for itself in a free
market. Substandard producers continue to "serve" the public.
Some argue, however, that important, informal control mechanisms
do exist. For example, in the context of acknowledging the absence
of any effective formal bar controls other than the system of client
complaints, staff counsel for one integrated state bar urged: "I think
control is, however, effectively imposed upon lawyers who are not
sole practitioners by their partners or employers. .e., you fire the
93. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 11, at 206.
94. The history of "quality control" through private malpractice litigation is not encour-
aging. Complaints of legal malpractice seem more closely related to problems of estrangement
between lawyer and client than to the lawyer's competence. The organized bar's response to
rising lawyer malpractice claims has been to declare an emergency-"the malpractice cri-
sis"-and increase public relations efforts. That burgeoning litigation may represent the
consequences of increased public awareness is an issue not addressed. Whether and to what
extent malpractice litigation could operate as a consumer protection device is a subject that
is rarely, if ever, professionally considered. That the organized bar might encourage such suits
apparently is unthinkable, as is the long-run and perhaps more likely potential for commer-
cial malpractice insurers to regulate admission to and continuation in the profession through
rate setting.
LAWYER AS PROFESSIONAL
incompetent and promote the quality producer." 5 A similar point
was made by Marks and Cathcart: "[I]n large law offices . . .
there are mechanisms for training, supervision, review, assignment,
and, in extreme cases, severance of relationship."" Whatever ele-
ment of truth there may be in these assumptions-and there is no
reason to believe there is much-one must see where that limited
truth leads. The severed "incompetent" does not leave the market;
he hangs up a shingle or joins a different association and continues
to offer substandard legal services to the public. Of course, sole
practitioners, to whom this supposed informal control mechanism
cannot be asserted to apply, constitute one of the largest single
categories of lawyers in the country. 7
There is simply no evidence of any effectively imposed informal
control over substandard performance in the legal services market. 8
In fact, it is commonly recognized that once a license is granted,
once the individual joins the homogenized whole, every tendency of
the market is to protect the incompetent lawyer, not to locate and
expel him.
2. There Are No Significant Formal Controls on Service Quality
Lawyer self-discipline and self-regulation have been extensively
analyzed and criticized both before and after the Clark Committee
95. Letter from Norman A. Faulkner, Staff Counsel and Assistant Executive Direc-
tor-Legal Affairs, The Florida Bar, to Robert H. Kennedy (Oct. 17, 1978). See also J. CARUN,
supra note 81, at 96-118 (commenting on the degree to which lawyer colleagues may support,
protect, and insulate one another in both adherence to and violation of ethical norms). The
social structure of law firms and other associations of lawyers and its effect on competence
and adherence to professional standards has been largely ignored.
96. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 11, at 205-06. There is probably more impact from the
acculturative effect on lawyers who become exposed to the attitudes of other lawyers and the
ethical climate of firms. Firms range from permissive to quite strict with regard to quality
and ethical standards; these standards probably become internalized by newer lawyers.
97. Id. at 200. It is reported that in 1972, there were approximately 31,000 sole practition-
ers, 24,000 "partnerships," and 23,000 "other" forms of associations. Pashigian, supra note
28, at 79. In 1978, the A.B.A. reported that there were 100,000 sole practitioners, 50,000
industry counsel, and 200,000 lawyers in associations. See Bradner, supra note 3, at 11.
Whatever the actual numbers, the bar has never warned the public that the sole practitioner
is a potential public hazard; in other words, the bar itself does not believe that the informal
control mechanism referred to in text accompanying notes 95 and 96 supra-i.e., monitoring
by the law firm-is operative.
98. More interesting is the apparent high quality of practice and ethical behavior among
lawyers, not the contrary. Why is it that so many lawyers, exposed as they are to pressures
and opportunities for profitable and undiscoverable slack behavior, seem to resist? Is there a
set of norms which is passed along? Are there, perhaps, self-regulating values and self-
perceptions which are grounded in the middle-class, near-uniformity of the group? What is
the effect of the licensure process on the lawyer's self-image and, consequently, on his post-
admission behavior?
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report." No serious inquiry credits the current system with ade-
quately protecting the public. All studies recognize the severe short-
comings of the current disciplinary system, even with regard to
forms of obvious lawyer misbehavior, let alone competence. There
simply are no standards and no systematic process for the review of
legal work; lawyer competency is ignored.'1'
Disciplinary proceedings, in law, are activated solely by com-
plaints. Their inability to monitor professional quality is widely
recognized.'0 '
A system of professional self regulation, to be adequate, must
reach beyond reliance on client complaints; it must supplement
client complaints with professional review of performance.
Performance standards, as distinct from conduct standards, need
to be applied in a no fault context; there must be adequate oppor-
tunities to review lawyer performance, and there must be refined
criteria on which to base continuing judgments about competence.
Moreover, the profession must want to regulate performance stan-
dards; it must be able to face the possibilities and realities of
incompetence among those already holding the license. 0 2
While exceptions occur, the discipline of practitioners, like initial
licensing, remains essentially a mechanism, a private and public
exhortation of professional status rather than the discharge of a
professional responsibility. Self-discipline by lawyers is a defini-
tional undertaking capable in reality of addressing only a limited
kind and number of nonquality-related conduct grievances-
disputes between clients and lawyers and between one lawyer and
another.1°3 Marks and Cathcart, discussing the operation of griev-
ance committees, have stated as one "central theme," that:
[Wihen we consider the disciplinary process as a whole we are
looking at the ways that the legal profession gives the appearance
of self-regulation without in fact engaging in the act of self-
99. CLmA REPORT, supra note 89. Much of this useful preliminary work has been under-
written by the American Bar Foundation. See, e.g., Marks & Cathcart, supra note 11, at 193
n.t; Steele & Nimmer, supra note 45, at 919 n.**.
100. See generally Marks & Cathcart, supra note 11.
101. Steele & Nimmer, supra note 45, at 922-23 ("With few exceptions, contemporary
disciplinary agencies maintain no significant, self-initiating investigative components. They
rely instead on third-party complaints received from four sources: clients, other attorneys,
nonprofessionals involved in a case, and public information (typically concerning criminal
prosecution of an attorney).").
102. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 11, at 203 (emphasis added).
103. The latter category-between one lawyer and another-is what Jerome Carlin has
classsified as "offenses against colleagues . . ., usually some form of client solicitation." J.
CALm, supra note 81, at 153. Certainly such offenses are rarely related to service quality.
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regulation. There is a subtle conversion of complaints about lawyer
performance into a search for misconduct, moral guilt, and devi-
ance. Performance standards tend to be abandoned in the pro-
cess. 104
While some theft and rapacious conduct by lawyers may come to
light, the honest rendering of inadequate legal services is an activity
which remains highly insulated by judges, by fellow counsel, and by
the bar-enforced ignorance of laymen. It is an activity wrapped
safely in the service provider's inherent advantage, in the unequal
relationship of lawyer to client, and in the guild etiquette between
lawyer and lawyer.
The lawyer-client relationship, while technically a contractual
one, is in fact often unilateral; 0 5 it is also one in which the client is
often in fact (and invariably by definition) unable to raise quality
of performance issues. The attorney typically, sometimes necessar-
ily, accepts a dominant and frequently intimidating posture of pro-
viding such services as he may deem appropriate in the manner he
finds correct. The client, often anxious, assumes the passive and
trusting posture of receiving those services. Clients-those upon
whom the complaint system exclusively relies-ordinarily have
little basis upon which to form any meaningful expectations for
services to be rendered'06 and no dependable criteria with which
to measure what has been received. Consequently, the complaint
process tends to reveal only that narrow range of gross misconduct
by obvious losers that patently injures a client or so badly offends
a fellow lawyer that it is clearly intolerable. 0 7 Such a system may
104. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 11, at 228 (emphasis added).
105. Steele & Nimmer, supra note 45, at 950.
106. The dynamics of the lawyer-client relationship and its stages have never been ade-
quately considered. It is a mixed game, often full of the ambivalence of each party in his
relationship to the other-a mix of potential risk and mutual advantage, exposure, bargain-
ing, dependence, conflict, partnership, and competition, with varying inequalities, expecta-
tions, and vulnerabilities. It is in many respects a reflection of conflict games between adver-
saries. For a good expression of some of the interdependent and collaborative aspects of the
situation, see J. CARLIN, supra note 81, at 66-83.
107. The CLARK REPORT, supra note 89, at 6, which ignored questions of lawyer compe-
tence, further notes regarding "misconduct":
Reliance on complaints only will never uncover some of the most serious forms of
professional misconduct-those that involve a conspiracy between the attorney and
the client. [A]reas of misconduct in which the client benefits as much as the
attorney are not likely to be reported by a client's complaint to a disciplinary
agency.
Clients are frequently a major source of the pressures on a lawyer to violate professional
norms; the vulnerable lawyer may be subject to situational pressures from his client which
he may resist only at great personal risk. The exploitation process between lawyer and client
is often a two-way street. J. CARLIN, supra note 81, at 71-76.
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identify some forms of misbehavior, but it is unrelated to any sys-
tematic maintenance of professional service quality.
Even if we should assume that the complaint process reveals and
disciplines those few forms of fault and misconduct for which the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides some distinct guide-
lines, there would be no more than an oblique effect upon lawyer
competence. Actual felons and able liars may well provide skilled
services to happy clients. Incompetent service also is provided by
the honest lawyer who ignores the simplicity or complexity of a
matter brought to him, who fails to appreciate the true dimensions
of a transaction, who is unmindful of his own ignorance, or who is
lazy, tired, stupid, disinterested, unconcerned, lacks courage and
the like. These are the elements of professional incompetence that
injure people. °s While such a lawyer may satisfy his ignorant client,
all of his product (except for client "comfort") is seriously deficient.
If there is a professional duty to protect the public by assuring a
minimum quality standard, it is not much advanced by looking to
unhappy clients to make public complaints. 09
Judges do not monitor quality to any socially or professionally
significant extent. Exposed to only the smallest part of what lawyers
do, they are too ill-informed to do the job. They do not really see
much lawyering. Even where poor service is rendered in their pres-
ence, judges routinely disassociate themselves from the task of su-
pervision. Practicing lawyers know that frequent assertions by the
courts (in defending licensure) that only licensed lawyers are subject
to standards of behavior which are supervised by the judiciary, is
108. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY DR 6-101 states, inter alia, that a lawyer
shall be subject to discipline for:
Failing to Act Competently.
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not
competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is compe-
tent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstan-
ces.
It may be misconduct to not report observed misconduct (including incompetence) by
another lawyer. The violation of any Disciplinary Rule is punishable misconduct under ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102. DR 6-101 provides that lawyers must act
competently, and DR 1-103 provides that lawyers shall report violations of Disciplinary Rules
by other lawyers. The failure to report observed incompetence arguably subjects a lawyer
(including a judge) to discipline. Here, as elsewhere in the Code, one problem is the difficulty
of enforcing abstractions.
109. If the organized bar and courts really believed that "fitness and character" or
"competence" were actually identified by the kind of inquiry presently made. and by the
examinations now required of applicants, it would be a simple administrative matter to
require attorneys to regularly update their bar applications and it would be possible to have
the membership periodically examined.
LAWYER AS PROFESSIONAL
simple professional froth."0 Such language suggests that which is
patently untrue, i.e., that the public may rely upon meaningful
judicial supervision of the quality of legal services. There is no such
supervision in any jurisdiction. Whatever theoretical obligation may
be imposed upon or accepted by judges, they simply do not see
enough of lawyering,"' much less actively monitor the quality of
what they do see."' Moreover, there is no evidence that judges are
qualified to assess lawyering accurately.
The ultimate responsibility both for admission to practice and for
the profession's self-enforcement of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility is vested in the state supreme courts."3 Exclusive judi-
cial control over admissions and over discipline of lawyers is, where
not incorporated into a constitutional provision,"' generally as-
serted to be inherent, and protected on the basis of a separation of
governmental powers."' These are powers ineptly exercised but jeal-
110. It [prohibiting unlicensed practice] is done to protect the public from
being advised and represented in legal matters by unqualified persons over whom
the judicial department can exercise little, if any, control in the matter of infrac-
tions of the code of conduct which, in the public interest, lawyers are bound to
observe.
State v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 1962) (emphasis added).
111. Though no information concerning the in-public aspects of the practice of law is
available, all of public advocacy is unlikely to represent as much as 25% of lawyering. See
Rubin, supra note 40, at 578 & n.2.
112. Maddi reports that even among those judges who reported observing incompetent
trial advocacy, 82% had never instituted disciplinary proceedings; of the remaining 18% who
had done so, over half had done so only once. Maddi, supra note 41, at 129-30.
113. Short of invading federal constitutional rights, as for example in Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), exclusive power to regulate admissions and to disci-
pline lawyers lies within the jurisdiction of state governments. Leis v. Flynt, 99 S. Ct. 698,
700-01 (1979). See also In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 186 So. 280, 285-86 (1938) (history of
Florida bar admissions); In re Day, 54 N.E. 646, 648-50 (Ill. 1899) (brief history of bar
admissions); D. MELLINKOFF, LAwYERS AND THE SYSTEM OF JUSTIcE: CASES AND NomS ON THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 17-21 (1976) (history of the legal profession); BAR EXAMINERS, supra note
38, at 109-14 (history of bar examinations).
114. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. V. § 2(a). The history of control over bar admissions in Florida
contains one of those coincidences that may bemuse the social historian. Some form of
licensing existed in Florida since the territorial act of August 12, 1822. From that time, with
variations, authority was exercised concurrently by the legislature and supreme court. All
graduates of state schools were admitted without examination after 1901. Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents For Higher Educ., 339 U.S.
637 (1950) signaled the end of racially segregated professional schools in June 1950. By ch.
26655, 1951 Fla. Laws 341 (repealed 1955), the Florida Legislature abandoned to the supreme
court its right to participate in bar admissions and simultaneously abolished the state's
diploma privilege-effective 1953-the year that the newly legislated "Negro" law school at
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University was expected to graduate its first students.
115. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs of Alabama State Bar v. State ex rel. Baxley, 324 So.
2d 256, 261-62 n.2 (Ala. 1976) (containing a list of jurisdictions exercising inherent control
over bar admissions); In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902, 905-06 (Fla. 1949) (the
judiciary has the inherent power to integrate the bar); Wallace v. Wallace, 166 S.E.2d 718,
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ously guarded against legislative (i.e., public) intervention."' It is
only recently that the judiciary has exerted exclusive control over
all lawyer conduct and lawyer licensing."' The extension of judicial
power to supervise nonforensic legal activities and to monitor repre-
sentation before forums other than courts is recent, and also ques-
tionable. It raises perplexing questions of separation of powers."'
Despite this almost complete judicial occupation of the lawyering
process, the courts have proved themselves clearly incapable of ade-
quately monitoring the quality of services provided to the public.
The judicial power that now exists is exercised, almost without
exception, in rulemaking and in final review of disciplinary matters
initiated by the disabled and presented for decision, if at all, by the
interested guild. Judicial rulemaking has some quality monitoring
potential, but it is not so employed in practice. Generally the disci-
plinary process is abandoned by the courts to grievance committees
of the bar. The committees operate on nothing much more limiting
than the abstractions and homilies of the ABA Code of Professional
723 (Ga.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939 (1969); In re Feingold, 296 A.2d 492, 496 (Me. 1972);
Belmont v. Board of Law Examiners, 511 S.W.2d 461, 462 (Tenn. 1974).
116. See, e.g., In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949); In re Integration
of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n., 275 N.W. 265 (Neb. 1937); R.J. Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d
407 (Okla. 1972).
117. The regulation of admissions to the profession is quite distinct from the judicial
power over discipline of practitioners. Admission is, absent specific controversy, not actually
a judicial function at all; no real adjudication is involved. In most professions, control is
maintained by legislative delegation of authority to a licensing board or committee (which
may or may not become a captive of the regulated group). In law, the admission process has
been delegated by the courts to an entity (usually held to be an administrative agency of the
court itself) commonly identified as the Board of Bar Examiners. The membership of these
boards is bar controlled; for example, in Florida, although the members of the Board of Bar
Examiners are appointed by the supreme court, the appointments are made solely from a list
of names submitted by the bar. Thus, eligibility is exclusively within the profession's determi-
nation. Furthermore, this delegation of power is accomplished without useful standards or
any adequate informing process. The standard applied in Florida is a wistful abstraction, i.e.,
the Board "attempts to view the ... whole person .... ," to isolate "that degree of honesty,
integrity and discretion that the public, and members of the bench and bar, have the right
to demand of a lawyer, judged by contemporary professional standards." Florida Board of
Bar Examiners, Application for Admission to the Florida Bar. The Florida Supreme Court
has, in the context of legislative delegation, insisted that "objective guidelines and standards
should appear expressly in the act or be within the realm of reasonable inference from the
language of the act where a delegation of power is involved and especially so where the
legislation contemplates a delegation of power to intrude into the privacy of citizens." Smith
v. Portante, 212 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 1968). Yet nothing approaching standards exists to
govern the court's own agency in the exercise of its powers.
118. For example, it would appear questionable that the judiciary has the right to deter-
mine from whom the executive and legislative branches of government may receive legal
advice; however, such an asserted right may be inferred from the Florida Bar's recent allega-
tions that an unlicensed member of a state university law faculty was engaged in
"unauthorized practice" for service as a legal resource person for the 1977 Constitution Revi-
sion Commission, an independent constitutional entity.
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Responsibility and what slim common law development may have
occurred. Court retention of the power of final review may preserve
appearances, but judicial potency was lost when the agenda was
relinquished. The power to initiate investigation and to charge at-
torneys with misconduct has been effectively surrendered, and
courts see only what the bar finds distressing and reveals. The incid-
ence of disciplinary proceedings directly initiated or actually re-
viewed by courts is so low as to be meaningless."9 Consequently, at
neither of the two points of contact between the judiciary and the
practicing bar, at neither the client representation level nor at the
disciplinary level, is there real judicial contact, judicial knowledge,
or significant judicial effect on the quality of legal services. The
public interest in lawyer competence is not advanced by judicial
assertions of quality control where no control in fact exists.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Consideration of entrance barriers to the practice of
law-examination, character investigation, and licensure-together
with lawyer self-discipline, suggests that these costly public proc-
esses are significantly unrelated to the maintenance of a level of
competent services. The negative evidence seems conclusive. These
mechanisms cannot be demonstrated to have more than a marginal
and random efficacy in that regard. They do not, in sum, provide
those public benefits which assertedly justify or compensate the
public for imposition of their cost. The professional task remains,
therefore, to determine why the community is to be taxed for the
maintenance of these barrier systems. What public benefits, if any,
result from these costly processes? A forthcoming article, to be pub-
lished in a later issue of this Review, will present a theory of licen-
sure which will attempt to answer these questions. An outline fol-
lows:
The efficacy of professional entrance examinations, of licensure,
market control, and of self-discipline is in no manner dependent
upon their real ability to determine, certify, or monitor the compe-
tence of those who practice the craft. Rather, their serviceability is
dependent upon a widely held belief (shared by public and bar) that
119. Carlin reports, for example, that of the approximately 1,450 complaints made an-
nually to the Association of the Bar of New York between 1951 and 1962, only about 19 ever
reached the courts. J. CARMN, supra note 81, at 151.
In some states, e.g., Florida, even standing to initiate complaints of "unauthorized practice
of law" has been held an exclusive incident of the integrated state bar. The power is denied
even to local associations of lawyers. Dade-Commonwealth Title Ins. Co. v. North Dade Bar
Ass'n, 152 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1963). See also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 878 (1961)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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they do so.'10 These barriers and mechanisms are components of the
process of professionalization and are, in the main, ceremonial. The
achievement and maintenance of professional status for an occupa-
tion is dependent upon wide public acceptance of and belief in the
existence of a body of quasi-scientific information that is suffi-
ciently arcane that it can be obtained only through special intelli-
gence, long study, or both, and which is believed to be employed
neutrally by the initiate in addressing important public matters.
Widespread belief in the technical difficulty of the knowledge and
in the public importance of its neutral use are essential characteris-
tics without which professional status can neither be achieved nor
maintained; if the belief is lost, the status can be lost. The ceremo-
nies of examination, licensure, and discipline satisfy the need for
assurance that practitioners possess a requisite amount of the spe-
cial knowledge. Character and fitness certifications are public attes-
tations that the initiate will employ that special information pro-
perly in the public interest. Self-discipline is significant not in its
particulars, but in the public knowledge that it exists to address a
recognized degree of error in initial choice-or the effects of changed
circumstance. These functions, not valued for their ability to ac-
complish their formalized objectives, are valued for their defini-
tional function. Consequently, to demonstrate that professional
examinations, licensure, and discipline are incompetent to do the
job publically assigned to them, i.e., to assure some minimum de-
gree of professional competence, is not to demonstrate that they are
without value; it is merely to suggest that function and value must
be otherwise described. It is that function and those values which
must then eventually be weighed against the costs they impose.
120. See generally Campbell, Lawyers and Their Public in LAWYERS IN THEIR SOCIAL
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